Government Speech and Online Forums: First Amendment Limitations on Facilitating and Moderating Public Discourse on Government Websites, by Ardia, David S.
University of North Carolina School of Law
Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2010
Government Speech and Online Forums: First
Amendment Limitations on Facilitating and
Moderating Public Discourse on Government
Websites,
David S. Ardia
University of North Carolina School of Law, ardia@email.unc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons
Publication: Brigham Young University Law Review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
DO NOT DELETE 3/21/2011 12:24 PM 
 
1981 
Government Speech and Online Forums: First 
Amendment Limitations on Moderating Public 
Discourse on Government Websites 
David S. Ardia` 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1982 
II. PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND ONLINE FORUMS ......................... 1985 
A. Government’s Growing Online Presence .................... 1985 
B. Private Speech and Online Forums ............................. 1989 
C. Applying Public Forum Analysis to Online Forums .... 1993 
1. Speaker-based restrictions in a public forum ......... 2000 
2. Content-based restrictions in a public forum ........ 2001 
III. THE EVOLVING GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE ........... 2010 
A. The Doctrine’s Genesis .............................................. 2011 
B. Government Speech on Government Websites ........... 2019 
C. The Nature of Public-Government Discourse ............. 2028 
IV. LIMITING THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE ............. 2029 
A. Ensuring that Government Can Be Held Accountable 
for Its Expressive Activities ....................................... 2031 
B. Accountability, Transparency, and Website Design ..... 2034 
1. Government-authored speech ............................... 2035 
2. Mixed governmental and private speech ............... 2037 
V. CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 2042 
 
 
  Fellow, Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School. Helpful 
feedback was provided by Bradley Abruzzi, Caroline Mala Corbin, John Fee, Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, RonNell Andersen Jones, Barry McDonald, Sheldon Nahmod, Mary-Rose Papandrea, 
Margaret Tarkington, Timothy Zick, and participants in the Brigham Young University Law 
Review Symposium on the Emerging Complexities of Government Speech. Valuable research 
assistance was provided by David O’Brien. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/21/2011 12:24 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
1982 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In order to function, government must speak. And in order to 
remain relevant, government must speak through the same channels 
that its citizens do. In today’s networked world, that means speaking 
on and through the Internet. When government engages in 
expressive activities online, however, it raises difficult questions 
about the limits of the government’s ability to control its own 
message, to subsidize the speech of others, and to restrict private 
parties from speaking.  
Courts typically apply the First Amendment’s public forum 
doctrine to answer these questions, but that doctrine is ill-suited to 
deal with online forums because it has not kept pace with the 
changes in public discourse in our increasingly networked world. As 
Justice Kennedy observed in Denver Area Education 
Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, “[m]inds are not changed 
in streets and parks as they once were”; instead, “the more 
significant interchanges of ideas and shaping of public consciousness 
occur in mass and electronic media,” especially online media.1 Yet 
the public forum doctrine, with its formalistic categories and arcane 
rules, provides neither judicial nor governmental flexibility in dealing 
with the myriad ways the public—and, increasingly, the 
government—speak online.  
While public forum analysis has become a “mainstay” in the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence,2 where it has been 
applied in such disparate circumstances as signs on public property3 
and charitable fundraisers in government workplaces,4 it has faced 
“nearly universal condemnation from commentators.”5 Indeed, 
courts6 and commentators7 alike have criticized the doctrine as 
 
 1. 518 U.S. 727, 802–03 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 2. Note, Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2140, 2145 (2009). 
 3. See Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 
789, 813–15 (1984). 
 4. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799–806 
(1985). 
 5. Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the 
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1715–16 (1987). 
 6. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 741 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“I have questioned whether public forum analysis, as the Court has employed it in 
recent cases, serves to obfuscate rather than clarify the issues at hand.”); Del Gallo v. Parent, 
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excessively formalistic, “‘serv[ing] only to distract attention from the 
real stakes’ at issue in disputes over public use of government 
resources for communicative purposes.”8 
To overcome the public forum doctrine’s shortcomings, courts 
are looking to the “recently minted”9 government speech doctrine to 
deal with conflicts over speech on government websites. Unlike the 
public forum doctrine, which is premised on the idea that “all 
citizens have an equal right to speak in the public forum and a right 
to equal treatment from the government,”10 the government speech 
doctrine is based on the assumption that government not only can, 
but must, privilege some viewpoints over others. In the Supreme 
Court’s most recent pronouncement on the government speech 
doctrine, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,11 the Court made this 
distinction clear: “If government entities must maintain viewpoint 
neutrality in their selection of donated monuments, . . . most parks 
would have little choice but to refuse all such donations. And where 
the application of forum analysis would lead almost inexorably to 
closing of the forum, it is obvious that forum analysis is out of 
place.”12 
The government speech doctrine, however, grants the 
government nearly carte blanche ability to exclude speakers and 
 
557 F.3d 58, 69 n.6 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The utility and coherence of the forum analysis doctrine 
have been the subject of criticism.”), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 740 (2009). 
 7. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government 
Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2001) (describing “public forum analysis” as “an edifice 
now so riven with incoherence and fine distinctions that it is on the verge of collapse”); Daniel 
A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and 
Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1266 (1984) (“Unless the 
Supreme Court transcends its geographical approach to the first amendment and abandons 
formal public forum analysis, it will continue to hand down decisions that fail to analyze 
thoughtfully the nature and role of first amendment principles in our society.”); Steven G. 
Gey, Reopening the Public Forum—From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1555 
(1998) (“The post-Perry public forum doctrine may not be the most fractured area in modern 
constitutional law, but it comes close.”). 
 8. Post, supra note 5, at 1716 n.7 (quoting Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral 
Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 93 (1987)). 
 9. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“To date, our decisions relying on the recently minted government speech 
doctrine to uphold government action have been few and, in my view, of doubtful merit.”). 
 10. Daniel W. Park, Government Speech and the Public Forum: A Clash Between 
Democratic and Egalitarian Values, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 113, 114 (2010). 
 11. 129 S. Ct. 1125. 
 12. Id. at 1138. 
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speech on the basis of viewpoint so long as the government can show 
that it “effectively controlled” the message being conveyed.13 
Because the government speech doctrine rewards the government 
for achieving the very things it is prohibited from doing under the 
public forum doctrine, it should come as no surprise that many 
scholars have criticized the doctrine as “unprincipled,”14 
“nefarious,”15 and the “ugly stepchild” of First Amendment 
jurisprudence.16 These criticisms are particularly apt when the 
doctrine is applied to expressive activities on the Internet, a medium 
that is growing increasingly important to public discourse. 
This Article describes in Part II how public discourse has moved 
from our streets and parks to virtual spaces hosted on the Internet. It 
then surveys the growing extent of government involvement in 
online speech platforms. Over the past decade, both federal and state 
governments have moved with alacrity to engage with their citizens 
online, launching thousands of government websites, including 
blogs, discussion boards, and other interactive platforms. Part II also 
highlights the challenges of applying public forum analysis to these 
digital forums, concluding that courts have constrained the doctrine 
to such a degree that it serves the interests of neither the public nor 
the government. 
Part III traces the short history of the government speech 
doctrine. Although the Supreme Court has yet to apply the doctrine 
to a government website, lower courts have been looking to the 
Court’s government speech cases for guidance in deciding disputes 
over speech restrictions on government websites. Part III reviews 
these cases, noting that the government speech doctrine as it is 
currently formulated fails to ensure that citizens can hold their 
government accountable for its expressive activities. Given 
government’s expanding use of online forums, it is likely that future 
 
 13. Id. at 1134. “[T]he Government’s own speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment 
scrutiny.” Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005). Under the 
government speech doctrine, the government “is entitled to say what it wishes,” Rosenberger 
v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995), and to select the messages 
that it wants to convey, see Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991). 
 14. Kelly Sarabyn, Prescribing Orthodoxy, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 367, 
372 (2010). 
 15. Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech When 
the Government Has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1314 (2010). 
 16. Note, The Curious Relationship Between the Compelled Speech and Government Speech 
Doctrines, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2411, 2432 (2004). 
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disputes will only add to the strain on a doctrine that has yet to find 
a coherent home within First Amendment theory. 
Part IV concludes by suggesting that the government speech 
doctrine should be grounded in meaningful governmental 
accountability.17 That is to say, the government speech doctrine 
should ensure that the recipients of government speech have enough 
information about the government’s expressive activities that they 
will be capable of holding the government accountable when it 
overreaches. For this accountability to be possible, the government 
must be required to clearly communicate its intent to claim speech as 
its own at the point of communication. Making such governmental 
transparency a touchstone for the government speech doctrine will 
bring many advantages. First, it will constrain a doctrine that is 
dangerously close to subverting core First Amendment principles. 
Second, ensuring that government is transparent about its expressive 
activities will improve government-public discourse. 
II. PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND ONLINE FORUMS 
A. Government’s Growing Online Presence 
Throughout most of the Internet’s history, government was slow 
to adapt to the new electronic medium as a place for public 
discourse. This is changing. The Internet is rapidly becoming 
government’s primary method of communicating with the public. A 
recent study by the Pew Internet & American Life Project found that 
“82% of internet users (representing 61% of all American adults) 
looked for information or completed a transaction on a government 
website in the twelve months preceding [Pew’s survey in December 
2009].”18 Moreover, these Internet users were not simply looking 
for government data and information; they wanted to engage with 
others and their government in order to express their views on 
government policy. According to Pew, “[n]early one quarter (23%) 
 
 17. The only limit on the government speech doctrine that the Supreme Court has 
identified is the government’s “accountab[ility] to the electorate and the political process for 
its advocacy.” Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 
(2000); see also Johanns, 544 U.S. at 563–64 (noting that “Congress, of course, retains 
oversight authority, not to mention the ability to reform the program at any time”). 
 18. Aaron Smith, Government Online: The Internet Gives Citizens New Paths to 
Government Services and Information, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 1, 2 (Apr. 
27, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Government_ 
online_2010_with_topline.pdf. 
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of internet users participate in the online debate around government 
policies or issues” on both government and private websites.19 
And government is listening. Within twenty-four hours after his 
election in 2008, President-elect Barack Obama’s transition team 
announced the creation of Change.gov, a website intended to be the 
central source for news and announcements about the new 
administration.20 Shortly after taking office, the new President 
directed all executive departments and agencies “to harness new 
technologies to put information about their operations and decisions 
online and readily available to the public.”21 And on March 26, 
2009, the White House held its first “online town hall,” where 
President Obama answered questions submitted via the Internet.22  
Today, federal, state, and local governments operate thousands 
of websites.23 Many government websites are strictly informational, 
without any opportunity for the public to engage with government 
officials or with each other. These sites range from the very simple 
municipal website operated by Bonner Springs, Kansas, that provides 
 
 19. Id. Interestingly, “[n]early one-third of online adults use digital tools other than 
websites to get information from government agencies or officials.” Id. at 26. 
 20. See Alina Cho, Obama Launches Web Site To Reach Public, CNN (Nov. 10, 2008, 
4:17 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/TECH/11/10/obama.wired/index.html. 
 21. Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009); see also 
Press Release, White House Announces Open Government Website Initiative (May 21, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/White-House-Announces-Open-Government-
Website-Initiative/ (announcing “an unprecedented process for public engagement in 
policymaking on the White House website”). While the Obama Administration’s objectives 
have received praise, open government organizations have criticized the government’s 
implementation. See, e.g., Elizabeth Montalbano, Gov 2.0 Summit: Advocate Calls USA 
Spending Data ‘Useless’, INFORMATIONWEEK (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www. 
informationweek.com/news/government/infomanagement/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=227
300266&subSection=News. 
 22. John D. Sutter, Obama Answers Handful of 104,000 Web Questions, CNN (Mar. 27, 
2009, 11:17 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/03/26/online.obama/; Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg, Obama Makes History in Live Internet Video Chat, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/us/politics/27obama.html. 
 23. Over 500 federal agency websites are listed on General Services Administration’s 
website at USA.gov, as well as a large number of state government websites. See 
http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/State_and_Territories.shtml. Government is also using online 
platforms provided by private parties such as Facebook and Twitter to communicate with 
citizens. See, e.g., Chris Snyder, Government Agencies Make Friends with New Media, 
EPICENTER (Mar. 25, 2009, 4:11 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/03/ 
government-agen/. Many of the issues raised here would also apply to these other forms of 
government communication, but this article’s focus is on government-owned or operated 
websites. 
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basic information about the city and its services24 to the richly 
detailed Recovery.gov, the federal government’s effort to provide 
comprehensive information about the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009.25 
A growing number of government sites do much more than 
simply provide information; they solicit public input and foster 
public discussion—and debate—on the issues facing government. 
For example, the State Department operates Exchanges Connect, an 
“online community managed by the U.S. Department of State’s 
Bureau of Educational & Cultural Affairs that highlights first-person 
stories about cultures, commonalities, and exchange program 
experiences.”26 And in Manor, Texas, the city maintains an active 
blog where the public can post comments, as well as an interactive 
calendar and extensive social media tools.27  
Another example of the government’s use of interactive features 
on its websites is the Federal Communications Commission’s 
Broadband.gov, which allows citizens to follow and participate in the 
development of the FCC’s National Broadband Plan, to share 
information with others, and to interact with the agency in real 
 
 24. BONNER SPRINGS, http://www.bonnersprings.org/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
 25. RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). According 
to the “about page” on recovery.gov, “[t]he American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 required that a website be created to ‘foster greater accountability and transparency in 
the use of funds made available in this Act.’” http://www.recovery.gov/About/ 
Pages/Recoverygov.aspx. The website went live on February 17, 2009, the day President 
Obama signed the Act into law and is operated by the Recovery Accountability and 
Transparency Board, an oversight group established by the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act. Id. “Although it is characterized as an informational resource, the site is 
unquestionably designed to persuade. The website features a video of the president explaining 
and promoting the Act, and describes how it will ‘save or create good jobs immediately.’” 
Nathan Murphy, Context, Not Content: Medium-Based Press Clause Restrictions on Government 
Speech in the Internet Age, 7 DENV. U. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 26, 55 n.196 (2009). 
 26. EXCHANGES CONNECT, U.S. Department of State, http://connect.state.gov/ (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2011). The site describes itself as an “international social network” and allows 
the public to “share” and “chat” about exchange programs. Id.  
 27. CITY OF MANOR, http://cityofmanor.org/ (last accessed Feb. 21, 2011). While the 
federal government “has earned the lion’s share of attention” around its open government 
initiatives, there has been considerable “momentum toward open government at the state and 
local level.” Alexander Howard, Harnessing the Civic Surplus for Open Government, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 23, 2010, 10:58am), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alexander-
howard/harnessing-the-civic-surp_b_734928.html (reporting that “innovation [at the state 
and local level] has been driven by tight budgets and the availability of inexpensive, lightweight 
tools for communication, collaboration and crowdsourcing”). 
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time.28 Broadband.gov is part of a set of websites developed by the 
FCC, including Reboot.FCC.gov and OpenInternet.gov, which also 
solicit public input on similar issues. In addition to operating the 
Broadband.gov domain, the FCC utilizes Broadband.ideascale.com, 
which is operated on behalf of the FCC by a private company and 
provides additional social media tools to solicit public feedback and 
discussion on the agency’s broadband initiatives.29 
As these examples attest, governments at all levels are launching 
websites and using interactive social media to communicate with 
their citizens. This is not surprising, given that communication is 
essential to governing and government has long sought to speak 
directly to the public.30 In the past, however, government typically 
had to communicate through the mediating influence of mass 
media.31 The Internet now gives government the ability to reach its 
citizens far more directly—and intimately—than it ever could in the 
past.32 Fortunately, government’s use of online media is benefiting 
citizens by breaking down the physical barriers to public discourse. 
But there is no guarantee that the government will continue to keep 
these online spaces open to private speech or that it will maintain 
them in such a way that robust public discourse can flourish. 
 
 28. The FCC and Broadband: The Next 230 Days, FCC COMMISSION MEETING, July 2, 
2009, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-291879A1.pdf. 
 29. At broadband.ideascale.com, users can contribute “ideas on the National Broadband 
Plan,” “brainstorm ideas with others to make them even better,” and “check out other 
people’s ideas, and vote on the ones you like best.” When submitting ideas, users can attach 
documents to posts, which other users can view online or download. Broadbank Idea Scale, 
FCC, http://broadband.ideascale.com/ (last accessed Feb. 21, 2011). The user interface for 
each post contains a comment button, “I agree” and “I disagree” buttons to submit votes, the 
total number of votes cast per post, an overall ranking assigned to the post, and a Twitter 
“Retweet” button and a Facebook “like” button for individual posts. Id. 
 30. As Justice Kagan noted before her elevation to the Supreme Court, “the more 
recent the president, the more often he goes public.” Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2300 (2001). 
 31. See CAROL GELDERMAN, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S WORDS: THE BULLY PULPIT AND 
THE CREATION OF THE VIRTUAL PRESIDENCY passim (1997); SAMUEL KERNELL, GOING 
PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP vii (1986) (noting that “modern 
presidents routinely appear before the American public on evening television on all kinds of 
issues ranging from national crises to the commemoration of a presidential library”). 
 32. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 7, at 1381 (noting that “the use of speech by 
government is expanding and taking new forms”); Anthony E. Varona, Toward a Broadband 
Public Interest Standard, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) (observing that “[i]t is the Internet, 
and not broadcasting, that today is considered the technology that is revolutionizing politics, 
democratic engagement, and society as a whole”). 
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B. Private Speech and Online Forums 
When we talk about freedom of speech, we need to pay careful 
attention to how public discourse actually occurs. We have long 
operated under an idealized misconception of free speech in which 
everyone has equivalent access to the organs of speech. The truth is 
that most people, because they do not own property that is 
conducive to public expression, do not have access to the means of 
speech or to the forums where they can effectively reach others.33 As 
Jerome Barron observed in 1967 when he argued that the First 
Amendment embraces a right of access to “the press,” historically we 
have been faced with a lack of access to the means of speech due to 
economic and institutional impediments.34 
Some would say that the Internet has changed this, but, in fact, 
“we’ve simply exchanged one set of intermediaries (e.g., newspaper 
publishers and broadcast stations) for another set of intermediaries 
(e.g., Internet service providers, content hosts, and search 
providers).”35 These intermediaries host, index, and distribute tens of 
billions of pages of online content.36 And this flow of digital speech 
is only increasing, as more and more expressive activity shifts from 
the physical world to the virtual world.37 While these changes have 
 
 33. See Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1115, 1117 (2005) (observing that “many individuals do not own property, much 
less property from which they can effectively express themselves on matters of importance 
within our democratic system”). 
 34. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 1641, 1641 (1967) (remarking that “[o]ur constitutional theory is in the grip of a 
romantic conception of free expression, a belief that the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is freely 
accessible”). The journalist A.J. Liebling captured this sentiment in his oft-repeated quote: 
“Freedom of the press is guaranteed only to those who own one.” A.J. Liebling, The Wayward 
Press: Do You Belong in Journalism?, THE NEW YORKER, May 14, 1960, at 105, 109. 
 35. David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of 
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L. 
REV. 373, 383–84 (2010) [hereinafter Ardia, Intermediary Immunity].  
 36. Id. at 377. For example, much speech happens on privately-owned sites such as 
YouTube, Blogger, Facebook, and Flickr. 
 37. See CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 24 (2007) (observing that the “mass 
media and the Internet as well have become far more important than streets and parks as arenas 
in which expressive activity occurs”); Judge Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Extremist Speech 
and the Internet: The Continuing Importance of Brandenburg, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 
365 (2010) (noting that “the internet comprises a substantial portion of that public sphere”). 
According to a Pew Research Center survey, “one in five Americans use digital tools to 
communicate with neighbors and monitor community developments.” Aaron Smith, Neighbors 
Online, Pew Research Center (June 9, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media// 
Files/Reports/2010/PIP-Neighbors-Online.pdf. Pew Research Center studies also indicate 
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“fundamentally altered the capacity of individuals, acting alone or 
with others, to be active participants in the public sphere,”38 they 
also have made the Internet an indispensable medium for public 
discourse.39 
Contrary to widely held belief, however, the Internet is not a 
public medium. It is, instead, a network of largely private networks, 
running on privately owned servers, routers, and backbones.40 After 
its initial role in creating the progenitors of the Internet,41 
government largely exited the scene, leaving private parties to take 
on the responsibility of serving as facilitators of public discourse 
online.42 While the government owns and maintains some websites 
and computer networks, most public discourse occurs on private 
websites and is facilitated by private Internet service providers.43 As a 
result, 
 
the Internet is ahead of national print newspapers, local print newspapers and radio as a source 
of news. Kristen Purcell, et. al, Understanding the Participatory News Consumer, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER (March 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/ 
2010/PIP_Understanding_the_Participatory_News_Consumer.pdf. 
 38. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 212 (2006). 
 39. See David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social 
Foundations of Defamation Law, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 272 (2010) [hereinafter 
Ardia, Networked World] (observing that “[v]irtual communities have sprung up, social 
networks have bloomed, and people are rushing onto the Internet to engage, argue, and 
disparage each other”). 
 40. Ardia, Intermediary Immunity, supra note 35, at 384–89.  
[T]he Internet has no central authority that determines what content can transect 
the network, or even who can connect to the network. This decentralized structure 
is intentional, and many believe it has been instrumental to the Internet’s 
widespread adoption as a communication tool and to the rapid pace of third-party 
innovation online. This lack of a central point of control also has made it possible 
for private intermediaries to take on a range of communication tasks and, not 
unexpectedly, they have proliferated. 
Id. at 384 (internal citations omitted). 
 41. See Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOCIETY,  
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (last accessed Feb. 21, 2011). 
 42. See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You—Fool Us Twice Shame 
on Us: What We Can Learn from the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the 
Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 131–32 (2001); Nunziato, supra note 33, at 
1116. 
 43. See Ardia, Intermediary Immunity, supra note 35, at 387–88 (“While anyone can set 
up a blog or Web site on a home server, few people do. Instead, the majority of the speech that 
occurs online is stored on or made available from servers owned by private intermediaries, the 
largest of which are operated by well-known brand names like Google and Yahoo!.”); 
Nunziato, supra note 33, at 1121–28. 
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when an anonymous blogger covering police corruption speaks to 
the world, he likely does so via a blog-hosting service such as 
Blogger. Groups espousing unpopular views assemble on social 
networking sites such as Facebook. Citizen journalists publish 
photos and videos via hosting sites such as Flickr and YouTube. 
Activists organize protests using microblogs such as Twitter. And 
artists perform music and poetry in virtual worlds such as Second 
Life.44 
Because these private intermediaries are not constrained by the 
First Amendment’s free speech protections, it is perilous for society 
to rely on them to provide forums for public discourse.45 Indeed, 
there are many examples of communication and content providers 
who have made viewpoint-based decisions over what speech to allow 
on their private networks and websites.46 When this private 
censorship happens, the public has little recourse because private 
parties have the power to determine—subject only to the voluntary 
limitations they may take on through their terms of use—when, 
how, and whether to make speech available to others.47  
Yet for democratic government to function—and for free speech 
rights to have meaning—citizens must have public spaces in which to 
express themselves.48 As Stephen Gey eloquently explains: 
 
 44. Ardia, Intermediary Immunity, supra note 35, at 388 (footnotes omitted). 
 45. See id. at 379 (observing that private intermediaries “do not always share society’s 
interest in ensuring a vibrant landscape for speech and often are unwilling to act as champions 
for the speech of third parties”); Seth Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, 
Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 28 
(2006) (noting that online intermediaries have a “fragile commitment to the speech that they 
facilitate”). 
 46. For example, after 78,000 Facebook users joined the “Boycott Target Until They 
Cease Funding Anti-Gay Politics” page on the social networking service, Facebook reportedly 
“locked down portions of the page—banning new discussion threads, preventing members 
from posting videos and standard Web links to other sites and barring the page’s administrator 
from sending updates to those who signed up for the boycott,” claiming that the page violated 
the company’s terms of service. Josh Gerstein, Activists Upset with Facebook, POLITICO (Sept. 
18, 2010, 7:07 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0910/42364.html. In 2007, 
Verizon rejected a request from the abortion rights group, Naral Pro-Choice America, to allow 
people to sign up for the organization’s text alerts, “saying it had the right to block 
‘controversial or unsavory’ text messages.” Adam Liptak, Verizon Rejects Text Messages from an 
Abortion Rights Group, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, at A1. 
 47. Ardia, Intermediary Immunity, supra note 35, at 388. 
 48. A rich history of philosophical and legal scholarship exists on this topic. See generally 
JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (Swallow Press 1954) (1927); JURGEN 
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1999) (1992).  
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The larger reality behind the myth of the debate on the public 
street-corner is that every culture must have venues in which 
citizens can confront each other’s ideas and ways of thinking about 
the world. Without such a place, a pluralistic culture inevitably 
becomes Balkanized into factions that not only cannot come to 
agreement about the Common Good, but also will not even know 
enough about other subcultures within the society to engage 
effectively in the deal-making and horse-trading that is the key to 
every modern manifestation of democratic government.49 
Gey laments the loss of public forums where citizens can engage 
in robust discourse. But his concern underlies a larger critique of 
modern society, which many commentators believe has become 
fractured and balkanized due to long-term changes in the structure 
of the media environment.50 While the Internet did not start this 
trend, recent research appears to support the view that it “may be 
making communication less democratic.”51 This is due, at least in 
part, to the fact that although there are millions of websites,52 only a 
few are well known and well trafficked. This “long tail”53 
phenomenon means that very few online speech platforms provide 
meaningful public reach, whereas the vast majority of sites are nearly 
invisible, except to the small niche audiences they serve.54 Given the 
 
 49. Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum–From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1535, 1538–39 (1998). 
 50. See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 216–46 (2000). 
 51. Murphy, supra note25, at 52; see also Aaron Smith, Government Online: The Internet 
Gives Citizens New Paths to Government Services and Information, PEW INTERNET & 
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 5 (Apr. 27, 2010) http://www.pewinternet.org/~/ 
media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Government_Online_2010_with_topline.pdf (finding that 
“Whites are significantly more likely than either African Americans or Latinos to participate in 
the online debate around government issues or policies (25% of online whites do this, 
compared with 14% of African Americans and Latinos) and are also much more likely to go 
online for data about government activities such as stimulus spending or campaign finance 
contributions”). 
 52. By some estimates, there are more than 227 million web servers responding to 
requests on the Internet. See September 2010 Web Server Survey, NETCRAFT (Sept. 17, 2010), 
http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2010/09/17/september-2010-web-server-survey.html. 
 53. “Long tail” was first coined by Chris Anderson who observed that “culture and 
economy are increasingly shifting away from a focus on a relatively small number of hits 
(mainstream products and markets) at the head of the demand curve, and moving toward a 
huge number of niches in the tail.” CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE 
OF BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF MORE 52 (2008). 
 54. See BENKLER, supra note 38, at 241 (observing that “there is a tiny probability that 
any given Web site will be linked to by a huge number of people and a very large probability 
that for a given Web site only one other site, or even no site, will link to it”); Oren Bracha & 
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way online discourse is currently facilitated by private parties, the 
structural inequalities that many had hoped the Internet would 
eliminate are in danger of being further entrenched. 
If, as Gey and others believe, public spaces for discourse are 
essential to a healthy society, we have reason to be concerned that 
the Internet lacks a true public forum. Dawn Nunziato, in her 
prescient article, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, argues 
convincingly that public forums play an essential role in ameliorating 
“the inequalities that disparities in private property ownership would 
otherwise impose on individuals’ free speech rights.” 55 The public 
forum doctrine occupies an essential place in the First Amendment 
firmament because it requires that the government “subsidize the 
speech of those who otherwise would not be able to express 
themselves effectively.”56 
Of course, government itself could provide a place for public 
discourse to occur online, as it has in the past through the 
maintenance of public streets and parks, but it remains an open 
question whether these virtual spaces will inherit the same 
protections for speech that we take for granted in the physical world.  
C. Applying Public Forum Analysis to Online Forums 
Long before the Internet reshaped our capacity to communicate, 
speakers who wanted to reach others typically made their way to the 
local public park, climbed up on a soapbox, and began speaking in 
the hope of attracting an audience.57 The First Amendment’s public 
forum doctrine reflects this history of physical spaces that “have been 
 
Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of 
Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1159 (2008) (observing that “the topology of the Web 
prevents us from seeing anything but a mere handful of the billion documents out there”). 
 55. Nunziato, supra note 33, at 1117. 
 56. Id.; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 37, at 23–24; Rebecca Tushnet, Domain and 
Forum: Public Space, Public Freedom, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS, 101, 104 (2007). 
 57. One of the best-known locations for public speech is Speakers’ Corner in Hyde 
Park, London.  
Officially sanctioned in 1872 by the Royal Parks and Gardens Regulation Act, 
Speakers’ Corner is a site for people to exercise their right of free speech. You can 
turn up, stand on a makeshift platform (the simplest being a milk crate), and speak 
about any topic you like, provided that your utterances do not contravene the 
Regulations. 
John Michael Roberts, The Enigma of Free Speech: Speakers’ Corner, The Geography of 
Governance and a Crisis of Rationality, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 271, 272 (2000).  
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used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions.”58  
The public forum doctrine, which saw its modern elaboration in 
Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,59 divides the 
speech landscape into three categories of forums.60 First, there is the 
“traditional” public forum, which consists of streets and parks where 
content-based exclusions must be “necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”61 Second, 
there is the “designated” or “limited” public forum, “consist[ing] of 
public property which the State has opened for use by the public as a 
place for expressive activity.”62 “Although a State is not required to 
indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does 
so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public 
forum.”63 Third, those locations that do not fall into the other two 
categories are denominated “non-public forums.”64 In this third 
category, the government “may reserve the forum for its intended 
purposes . . . as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and 
not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials 
oppose the speaker’s view.”65 
Not surprisingly, non-public forums “constitute[] the largest 
class of government property.”66 In a non-public forum, the 
government has many of the powers of a private owner, including 
the “power to preserve the property under its control for the use to 
 
 58. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
 59. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
 60. Id. at 45–49. 
 61. Id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)). 
 62. Id. at 45. In the public forum context, it is generally believed that the terms 
“limited” and “designated” refer to the same type of forum. See Note, Strict Scrutiny in the 
Middle Forum, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2140, 2142 n.11 (2009). Although the Court has on 
occasion indicated that there might be a difference between the two “middle forums” in that 
the government might by its words or deeds “designate” a public forum that carries the same 
obligations as the traditional public forum, see Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 
2971, 2984 n.11 (2010); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726–27 (1990); Cornelius 
v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); Perry, 460 U.S. at 
45, “the Court has never found such a designated public forum to exist,” Frederick Schauer, 
Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 98 n.74 (1998). 
 63. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
 64. Id. at 46–47. 
 65. Id. at 46 (citing U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 
114, 131 n.7 (1981)). 
 66. Daniel W. Park, Government Speech and the Public Forum: A Clash Between 
Democratic and Egalitarian Values, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 113, 120 (2010). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/21/2011 12:24 PM 
1981 Government Speech and Online Forums 
 1995 
which it is lawfully dedicated.”67 This includes the right to control 
access and to make distinctions on the basis of subject matter and 
speaker identity.68 The government’s ability to constrain speech on 
these bases, however, is not unlimited. The restrictions must be 
“reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue 
serves.”69 And, as with all three public forum categories, the 
government cannot discriminate based on a speaker’s viewpoint 
unless it can satisfy strict scrutiny.70  
Judicial application of the public forum doctrine typically entails 
a two-step process. First, the court decides which type of forum is 
implicated.71 Second, the court applies the appropriate level of First 
Amendment scrutiny to the challenged restrictions on speech. As 
with so much constitutional law, the choice of category often 
determines the outcome in a public forum case. And it is at this stage 
that the application of the public forum doctrine to government 
websites gets tricky.  
Given that online forums lack the tangible characteristics—but 
share many of the expressive capabilities—of the physical locations 
we are accustomed to, we start by asking what the appropriate 
analogy is for understanding these virtual “places.”72 Over its short 
 
 67. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (quoting Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. at 129–30 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
 68. Id. at 49. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 
(1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be 
unconstitutional.”). 
 71. If a legal challenge were directed at different parts of a government website, a court 
would likely evaluate each distinct part of the website separately to determine the appropriate 
levels of judicial scrutiny. Cf. Neinast v. Bd. of Trs. of Columbus Metro. Library, 346 F.3d 
585, 591–92 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that various aspects of public library warranted 
separate analysis); Ill. Dunesland Pres. Soc. v. Ill. Dept. of Natural Res., 587 F. Supp. 2d 1012 
(N.D. Ill. 2008) (holding that although state park was a traditional public forum, a display rack 
in the park was a nonpublic forum), aff’d on other grounds, 584 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2009); see 
also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1137–38 (concluding that although 
parks are a traditional public forum, monuments placed in them are not subject to forum 
analysis). 
 72. Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 
CALIF. L. REV. 439, 473 (2003) (noting that the “cyberspace as place metaphor is . . . clearly 
evident in legal material”). We have always tried to understand something new through 
analogy and the public forum doctrine is rife with this approach. See Denver Area Educ. 
Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 749 (1996) (noting the search for analogies 
in public forum jurisprudence and cautioning that “we are wary of the notion that a partial 
analogy in one context, for which we have developed doctrines, can compel a full range of 
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life, the Internet and its expressive locales have been likened to an 
“information superhighway,”73 a “bulletin board,”74 a “park,”75 and 
a “series of tubes.”76 Another metaphor that has recently come into 
popular usage is that of a “platform.”77 Tarleton Gillespie, professor 
of communications at Cornell University, states that use of the term 
“platform” has “emerged in reference to online content-hosting 
intermediaries,” such as YouTube and Facebook, and points “to a 
common set of connotations: a ‘raised, level surface’ designed to 
facilitate some activity that will subsequently take place.”78 It is a 
wonderfully evocative term, suggesting, as Gillespie notes, “a 
progressive and egalitarian arrangement, promising to support those 
who stand upon it.”79 
As anyone who has browsed the Internet can attest, the medium 
is highly conducive to public discourse.80 Some of the most visceral 
 
decisions in such a new and changing area”). Of course, the choice among competing 
analogies has important implications beyond the public forum and government speech 
contexts. See Susan P. Crawford, Internet Think, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 467, 
467 (2007) (suggesting that “how ‘the Internet’ is understood has substantial legal, social, and 
cultural consequences”). 
 73. See, e.g., Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1996) 
(noting that the Internet has been referred to as “the information superhighway”). 
 74. See, e.g., James Pooley, The Top Ten Issues in Trade Secret Law, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 
1181, 1185 (1997) (“The Internet is, in many ways, like the notices you see on the bulletin 
board at your local supermarket.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Edward J. Naughton, Is Cyberspace A Public Forum? Computer Bulletin 
Boards, Free Speech, and State Action, 81 Geo. L.J. 409, 431 (1992) (noting that computer 
networks share many of the characteristics of “sidewalks, streets, and parks”). 
 76. Alex Curtis, Senator Stevens Speaks on Net Neutrality, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (June 
28, 2006), http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/497 (Senator Stevens speaking during a 
full committee markup); see also Jim Puzzanghera, Weighing High-Tech Bills in Analog: 
Political Issues Pile up in the Fast-Evolving Sector, but Congress’ Expertise Isn’t up to Date, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2006, at C1 (noting the ridicule directed at former Senator Ted Stevens for 
describing the Internet as “a series of tubes”). 
 77. Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of “Platforms,” 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC. 347, 347–48 
(2010). Gillespie observes that the term has especially “gain[ed] traction around user 
generated content, streaming media, blogging, and social computing.” Id. at 351. But it has 
also found use in other contexts as well. See Tim O’Reilly, Gov 2.0: It’s All About the Platform, 
TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 4, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/09/04/gov-20-its-all-about-
the-platform/ (envisioning “government as a platform” and suggesting that “government 
agencies shouldn’t just provide web sites, they should provide web services”). 
 78. Gillespie, supra note 77, at 350. Gillespie notes, however, that “‘platform’ [is] a 
claim that arguably misrepresents the way YouTube and other intermediaries really shape 
public discourse online.” Id. at 349. 
 79. Id. at 350. 
 80. See, e.g., Lincoln Dahlberg, The Internet and Democratic Discourse: Exploring the 
Prospects of Online Deliberative Forums Extending the Public Sphere, 4 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 
DO NOT DELETE 3/21/2011 12:24 PM 
1981 Government Speech and Online Forums 
 1997 
illustrations of the Internet’s capacity for public discourse can be 
seen in what are called virtual worlds, which are three-dimensional 
computer-based simulated environments where people interact with 
others through personal avatars that are capable of, among other 
things, shouting, articulating, and throwing up their hands.81 The 
most popular virtual worlds are massive multiplayer online games, 
but Second Life, which claims several million members, has been 
used for various forms of civic engagement by the government.82 
The U.S. State Department, for example, created a three-
dimensional “embassy” in Second Life that visitors can enter and 
that the department uses to “inform, influence, and engage with the 
world.”83 
The fact that the public is actually using a government-furnished 
online forum for public discourse, however, does not make that 
 
615, 620 (2001) (noting that “many spaces of discourse exist online” and describing 
“numerous forums of informal public interaction on Usenet groups, e-mail lists, web boards 
and chat groups where participants enter into rational–critical debate”). 
 81. See, e.g., David Assalone, Law In The Virtual World: Should The Surreal World of 
Online Communities Be Brought Back to Earth By Real World Laws?, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. 
L.J. 163, 166 (2009) (“From its inception, Second Life has allowed individuals to create their 
own personal characters and control these characters’ movements in a virtual world filled with 
grass, trees, buildings, streets and rivers.”); Adam Chodorow, Tracing Basis Through Virtual 
Spaces, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 283, 288 (2010) (“Virtual worlds are online spaces that permit 
people to interact with one another through characters they create, often called avatars.”). 
 82. See Ardia, Networked World, supra note 39, at 275; Cheryl Pellerin, U.S. 
Government Presence Grows in Second Life Online World, AMERICA.GOV                            
(May 8, 2007), http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2007/May/20070508163536 
lcnirellep0.2645075.html (reporting that federal agencies that are interacting with the public 
through Second Life “include the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), NASA, the National Institutes of Health and its National Library of Medicine 
(NLM), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. House of 
Representatives”). 
 83. Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 899, 900 (2010) (quoting Victor E. Riche, Presentation to the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., Government 2.0: Privacy and Best Practices Workshop (June 22, 2009)); L. Gordon 
Crovitz, Information Age: From Wikinomics to Government 2.0, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2008, at 
A.13. Users can also create parks, buildings, and even virtual towns. The City of Allston, MA 
used Second Life to build a virtual city park that residents could access; it then solicited 
feedback from residents to help with the design of the actual park. Julia Galef, Q&A: Eric 
Gordon on Community Planning with Second Life, METROPOLIS MAG.,  (June 8, 2009, 
1:31pm) http://www.metropolismag.com/pov /20090608/qa-eric-gordon-on-community-
planning-with-second-life. Not only did the virtual park serve as a locus for conversation about 
the park’s design, the city, by suggesting that residents take on avatars that were disabled, 
appears to have impacted public perceptions of the importance of accommodations for the 
handicapped. Interview with Gene Koo, Fellow at the Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y,  in 
Cambridge, Mass. (Aug. 19, 2008).  
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forum a traditional public forum for First Amendment purposes. In 
Hague v. CIO, the touchstone for this category of public forum, the 
Supreme Court instructed that traditional public forums are places 
that have “immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public 
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.”84 Given the Internet’s short history, there is little chance 
that a website, or indeed anything on the Internet, would be 
considered a traditional public forum under the Hague test.85 
Can this definition expand over time, taking into account how 
people actually assemble and communicate? The Supreme Court 
faced this question in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 
Inc. v. Lee, where it had to determine whether an airport terminal 
operated by a public authority was a public forum.86 Although the 
Court seemed willing to take into account that the public was using 
the airport for expressive purposes, it refused to grant an airport 
terminal traditional public forum status because, “given the lateness 
with which the modern air terminal has made its appearance, it 
hardly qualifies for the description of having immemorially . . . been 
held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive 
activity.”87 If the Court deems an airport terminal to be too modern 
to be considered a traditional public forum, then it should come as 
no surprise that it views the provision of Internet access at a public 
library to be equally unqualified for such categorization.88 
In the end, it is likely that a government website that allows 
private speech will be viewed under the public forum doctrine as a 
 
 84. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & 
Educ. Fund, Inc., the Court stated that a traditional public forum is property that has as “a 
principal purpose . . . the free exchange of ideas.” 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). 
 85. See Nunziato, supra note 33, at 1161 (“No expressive forum on the Internet will 
ever be deemed a ‘traditional’ public forum—one that has ‘immemorially’ and ‘time out of 
mind’ been held in trust for the use of the public for expressive purposes—under the public 
forum doctrine as it is currently conceived.”). 
 86. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).  
 87. Id. at 680 (internal quotation marks omitted). Concurring, Justice Kennedy 
criticized the majority opinion for its myopic focus on history rather than function, warning 
that “[w]ithout this recognition our forum doctrine retains no relevance in times of fast-
changing technology.” Id. at 697 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 88. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 204–05 (2003) (holding that 
libraries’ provision of Internet access did not constitute a traditional public forum because “this 
resource . . . did not exist until quite recently”). Recent cases involving municipal websites bear 
this out. See infra notes 195–204 and accompanying text. 
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limited public forum89—that is, “public property which the State has 
opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity.”90 
Given that the level of First Amendment scrutiny courts apply to 
speech restrictions in a limited public forum is the same as in a 
traditional public forum, the choice between those categories may 
seem inconsequential. But this ignores the fundamental difference 
between the two categories: in a traditional public forum, the 
government must keep the forum open for public expression.91 In a 
limited public forum, the government can close the forum at its 
choosing.92  
This distinction matters a great deal because, although public 
discourse has moved from our streets and parks to virtual forums 
hosted on the Internet, these online forums exist at the whim of 
private parties and are therefore ephemeral.93 Consequently, 
government has an important role to play in ensuring that the public 
has access to online venues where citizens can confront each other’s 
ideas and ways of thinking about the world. In fact, some scholars 
have gone so far as to argue that, where private media fails to foster 
adequate public dialogue, “the First Amendment requires the 
government to create at least some public forums that provide 
effective means of communication.”94  
As noted previously, both federal and state governments are 
beginning to embrace this role by opening their websites to various 
forms of public discourse. In doing so, government—just like private 
website operators—must make choices about who can speak, what 
 
 89. For a discussion of whether a court might view the content on the website as 
government speech, see infra Part II.B. 
 90. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). To 
determine whether a limited public forum exists, the Court analyzes the government’s intent 
to create such a forum by examining its “policy and practice” as to the forum as well as “the 
nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity.” Cornelius v. NAACP 
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). 
 91. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, supra note 37, at 23 (“A distinctive feature of [the 
traditional public forum] is that it creates a right of speakers’ access, both to places and to people. 
Another distinctive feature is that the public-forum doctrine creates a right, not to avoid 
governmentally imposed penalties on speech, but to ensure government subsidies of speech.”).  
 92. See Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814–
15 (1984); DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
 93. See infra Part II.B. 
 94. J. M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First 
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 412; see also Barron, supra note 34, at 1641. 
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expressive activities to allow, and whether to moderate the speech of 
third parties. Unlike private website operators, however, the 
government’s choices must comport with the First Amendment.  
1. Speaker-based restrictions in a public forum 
The first question facing all website operators is who they should 
permit to speak. Of course, the government can choose not to allow 
any private speech on its website, thus creating a non-public forum.95 
If, however, the government allows members of the public to post 
comments or otherwise engage in expressive activities, it will likely 
have created a limited public forum, and its discretion to exclude 
speakers will be constrained.  
When the government establishes a limited public forum, it is 
not required to allow all persons access to the forum. The 
government may be justified “in reserving [its forum] for certain 
groups or for the discussion of certain topics,”96 as long as the 
restrictions are reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum and 
“not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials 
oppose the speaker’s view.”97 Thus, if a public school were to 
voluntarily open its website only to students—and that limitation 
were reasonable in light of the website’s purpose—it would not have 
to provide access to adults.98  
One of the most pressing concerns facing website operators is 
whether they should allow speakers who are associated with groups 
that advocate or incite discrimination, hate, or violence. The 
government’s power to impose such speaker-based restrictions in any 
type of forum is quite limited. In fact, as one scholar notes, “[u]se 
restrictions on groups who discriminate or may incite violence . . . 
 
 95. Many government websites do not permit the public to post comments or otherwise 
engage in speech on the site, but instead are reserved for the posting of government data and 
communications from government employees. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
 96. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
 97. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).  
 98. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (noting “[t]he necessities of confining a forum to 
the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify the State in reserving it 
for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics”); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. 
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806–07 (1985) (allowing the federal government to limit participation in 
a federal employee charity drive to direct service charities, while excluding legal defense and 
political advocacy organizations, because the government’s rationale of avoiding disruptive 
controversy was reasonable in light of revenue-raising purpose of the program). 
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consistently have been struck down on the basis of viewpoint 
discrimination as well as other constitutional norms.”99 
For example, in Cuffley v. Mickes, the Eighth Circuit held that 
Missouri’s attempt to exclude the Ku Klux Klan from participation in 
its Adopt-a-Highway Program was unconstitutional.100 Under the 
Missouri program, groups that agreed to keep a section of highway 
clean received public acknowledgment of their participation on a 
sign posted adjacent to the highway. The court held that Missouri’s 
refusal to allow the KKK to participate based on the state’s policy of 
prohibiting groups that discriminate101 was a violation of the 
organization’s First Amendment rights.102 The court concluded that 
“[r]equiring the Klan essentially to alter its message of racial 
superiority and segregation by accepting individuals of other races, 
religions, colors, and national origins in order to adopt a highway 
would censor its message and inhibit its constitutionally protected 
conduct.”103 
In summary, while the government has some discretion under 
the public forum doctrine to impose speaker-based restrictions on its 
websites, those restrictions must be reasonable in light of the 
purpose of the forum. Furthermore, the government may not 
exclude speakers on the basis of their viewpoints unless it can satisfy 
strict scrutiny.104  
2. Content-based restrictions in a public forum 
Government confronts even more limits when it seeks to impose 
content-based restrictions on the speech of private parties. Given that 
content-based restrictions are quite common on private websites, it is 
likely that government will want to apply them as well. The types of 
 
 99. Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement Relationships: 
New Extensions of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 85 (2004). 
 100. 208 F.3d 702, 711 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 101. The Missouri program stated: “Applicants must adhere to the restrictions of all state 
and federal nondiscrimination laws. Specifically, the applicant must not discriminate on the 
basis of race, religion, color, national origin or disability. Such discrimination disqualifies the 
applicant from participation in the program.” MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 7, § 10-
14.030(2)(B) (1995), quoted in Cuffley, 208 F.3d at 707 n.4. 
 102.  Cuffley, 208 F.3d at 705–06. 
 103. Id. at 708. 
 104. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985). Content-
neutral restrictions are analyzed under the less restrictive time, place, and manner test. See 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116–17 (1972). 
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restrictions that private website operators impose are varied, but they 
often take the form of subject-matter limitations,105 bans on indecent 
material,106 and civility policies that prohibit certain profane, 
personal, or contentious comments from users.107  
In regulating expressive activities in a limited public forum, the 
government has some latitude to set limits on the basis of subject 
matter, so long as the limitations are “reasonable in light of the 
purpose served by the forum.”108 A subject-matter restriction will be 
subject to strict scrutiny, however, if the government has opened up 
the forum to a wide variety of subjects or communicative 
purposes.109 For example, if the U.S. State Department were to 
create a website dedicated only to discussing student exchange 
programs, it would likely be permitted to limit speakers to that issue. 
But if the government is not vigilant in maintaining the forum’s 
focus or otherwise opens the forum for general discussion, it cannot 
exclude speakers based on subject matter without satisfying strict 
scrutiny.110 
 
 105. For example, the forum rules for MacRumors, a site that reports on news about 
Apple, states that “[o]ff-topic posts will be deleted/edited. . . . Threads and posts on 
controversial political, religious, and social issues are to be limited to the Politics, Religion, 
Social Issues forum, and made only by those eligible for that forum.” MACRUMORS, Help: 
Forum Rules, http://guides.macrumors.com/Help:Forum_Rules#Things_Not_to_Do (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2011); see also Ken Fisher, Ars OpenForum Posting Guidelines and General 
Information, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 1, 2000, 2:00pm), http://arstechnica.com/ 
old/content/2000/01/postguide.ars (“No commercial-oriented posts, and no flooding with 
useless content or content designed to engage readers into forum wars or trolling other 
sites.”). 
 106. For example, YouTube’s Terms of Service state that prohibited forms of expression 
include “pornography or sexually explicit content” and “animal abuse, drug abuse, under-age 
drinking and smoking, or bomb making.” YOUTUBE, Terms of Service, http:// 
www.youtube.com/t/terms and http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
 107. For example, Wikipedia’s civility policy states that “[c]ivility is part of Wikipedia’s 
code of conduct” and defines incivility as “personal attacks, rudeness, disrespectful comments, 
and aggressive behaviours that disrupt the project and lead to unproductive stress and 
conflict.” WIKIPEDIA, Wikipedia: Civility (Feb. 17, 2011, 9:22pm), http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/ Wikipedia:Civility. 
 108. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. 
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“Once it has opened a limited forum, however, the State 
must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set.”). 
 109. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Sw. Ohio Reg’l Transit 
Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 352–53 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 110. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1394 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing 
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983)) (“The state 
cannot constitutionally penalize private speakers by restricting either their right to speak or the 
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Furthermore, some subject-matter restrictions are particularly 
problematic. For example, courts have been skeptical of government 
policies that restrict the discussion of religious111 or political112 
subjects because such policies invariably involve distinctions that blur 
the line between content and viewpoint discrimination. Similarly, 
governmental attempts to impose “no public controversy policies” in 
public forums have been uniformly struck down.113 Indeed, 
whenever the government attempts to prohibit or restrict 
controversial subjects, it opens itself up to charges of viewpoint 
discrimination because often “the line between content and 
viewpoint is quite faint.”114 
In addition to establishing subject-area limits, many private 
websites also prohibit the posting of indecent material. As history has 
shown, the regulation of indecency is a topic of perpetual interest to 
the government,115 although its efforts to ban indecent speech on the 
Internet have seen little success.116 If the government sought to 
 
content of their speech simply because the state exhibited dubious wisdom in creating, or has 
been slovenly in its maintenance of, its public fora.”); Planned Parenthood Ass’n/Chi. Area v. 
Chi. Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1232 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that because transit 
authority maintained “no system of control” and accepted a broad range of advertisements it 
had created a public forum in its bus advertising space and could not reject an advertisement 
relating to abortion). 
 111. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001) (instructing 
that “speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a limited 
public forum on the ground that the subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint”); DeBoer 
v. Vill. of Oak Park, 267 F.3d 558, 569 (7th Cir. 2001) (“By restricting the plaintiffs from 
using the means of expression that best reflects their views on how to address civic problems or 
best provides the reasons (albeit grounded in Christianity and the Bible) as to why they believe 
their viewpoint to be persuasive, the Village is requiring a ‘sterility of speech’ from the plaintiffs 
that it does not demand of other groups with regard to this requirement.”). 
 112. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Dep’t of Aviation of Chi., 45 F.3d 1144, 1159–60 
(7th Cir. 1995) (invalidating policy that prohibited political advertisements in O’Hare Airport 
and noting that a “view labeled as ‘political’ (presumably because it is controversial or 
challenges the status quo) may nevertheless exist in opposition to a view that has otherwise 
been included in a forum”). 
 113. See Dolan, supra note 99, at 84 (observing that “[e]very court to consider the issue 
has struck down government attempts to limit forum content by a ‘no public controversy’ 
policy”). 
 114. Id. at 72. 
 115. See KIMBERLY A. ZARKIN & MICHAEL J. ZARKIN, THE FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION: FRONT LINE IN THE CULTURE AND REGULATION WARS 
128–32 (2006) (describing the “long and complicated” history of the FCC’s regulation of 
indecency). 
 116. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (finding Child Online Protection Act 
to be unconstitutional); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (finding large sections of 
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prohibit such speech on its own websites, it would need to show that 
indecent speech is disruptive to the purpose of the forum.117 Even if 
the government were able to show that this disruption would occur, 
however, its ability to limit material that is indecent—but not 
obscene—is doubtful.118 Courts have repeatedly held that the term 
“indecent” lacks objective and definite standards.119 As Erwin 
Chemerinsky has noted, “[w]hat is decent or indecent depends 
entirely on the evaluator’s views.”120  
Another common way that private websites limit speech is 
through “civility” or “decorum” policies. These codes of conduct 
typically prohibit certain types of profane, personal, or contentious 
comments from users. If the government were to implement such a 
policy on its websites, it would likely face significant First 
Amendment challenges. As a threshold matter, the civility 
requirements would need to contain “narrow, objective, and definite 
standards” to ensure that the government does not engage in 
viewpoint discrimination.121 Courts have consistently invalidated 
 
the Communications Decency Act to be unconstitutional). But see United States v. Am. 
Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (upholding Children’s Internet Protection Act that 
required public schools and libraries receiving E-Rate discounts to install Internet filtering 
software as a condition of receiving federal funding). 
 117. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 582 (1998) (rejecting 
facial challenge to law that allowed the National Endowment for the Arts to take “decency and 
respect” for public values into consideration when providing grants to artists). But see Se. 
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553–59 (1975) (finding municipal theater’s refusal 
to allow production of musical “Hair” because it “would not be ‘in the best interest of the 
community’” was unconstitutional content discrimination in a public forum). 
 118. Obscene expression falls outside the scope of First Amendment protection and is 
defined by the Supreme Court’s three-part test in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 
(1973). Unlike obscenity, indecent speech is protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, 
government can regulate such speech only if its interests are sufficiently compelling. See Reno, 
521 U.S. at 870–74 (rejecting effort to ban indecent speech on the Internet). 
 119. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008) (noting “we have struck down 
statutes tied to criminal culpability to whether the defendant’s conduct was ‘annoying’ or 
‘indecent’—wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing context, or 
settled legal meanings.”). Under the First and Fifth Amendments, speakers are protected from 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of vague standards. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 875 
(invalidating provisions in Communications Decency Act that would have prohibited posting 
“indecent” or “patently offensive” materials in a public forum online); see NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963). 
 120. Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: 
Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CALIF. L. REV. 49, 58–59 (2000). 
 121. Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 (1992) (finding that an 
ordinance requiring a permit before authorizing public speaking, parades, or assemblies was a 
prior restraint and instructing that “‘a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment 
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government efforts to limit speech pursuant to policies that merely 
leave it to the government’s discretion to determine what is 
acceptable.122 
Furthermore, as with the other restrictions discussed in this 
Section, the government would need to show that its civility policy 
was reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum. The 
government is most likely to have success if its policy targets 
depictions of graphic violence and sex. Several cases suggest that it 
would be acceptable for the government to bar such content if it 
specifically describes the prohibited material so that officials can 
apply the restrictions neutrally.123 As to speech that is merely in bad 
taste or offensive, however, it is unlikely that the government could 
prohibit such speech without satisfying strict scrutiny. As the Court 
admonished in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, “the fact that society 
may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing 
it.”124  
 
freedoms to the prior restraint of a license’ must contain ‘narrow, objective, and definite 
standards to guide the licensing authority’”) (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 
394 U.S. 147, 150–151 (1969)).  
 122. See Amandola v. Town of Babylon, 251 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 2001) (invalidating 
town’s implementation of policy for use of its meeting rooms where policy contained no 
enumerated limitations on content); Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150 v. Vill. of 
Orland Park, 139 F. Supp. 2d 950 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (invalidating village ordinance that merely 
stated that banners on light poles must be approved by Village Board, without providing any 
standards for acceptance). 
 123. See Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that city 
art gallery could reject overtly sexual art if it did so pursuant to objective standards that 
carefully describe the types of art that would be rejected); AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., Inc. 
v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1994) (remarking that transit authority 
could prohibit certain types of explicit sexual advertising if it did so through a precise standard 
that it applied neutrally). Mary Jean Dolan suggests, however, that “captive audiences, 
combined with the inescapable visuals and the low value of such speech, probably accounts for 
courts’ suggestions that such content limits could pass muster.” Dolan, supra note 99, at 88. 
 124. 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978). In Cohen v. California, where the defendant challenged 
his conviction for “wearing a jacket bearing the words ‘Fuck the Draft,’” Justice Harlan 
explained why offensive speech should be accorded First Amendment protection: 
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear to be only 
verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are, however, within 
established limits, in truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring values 
which the process of open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at times 
seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of 
strength. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a 
trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege, these 
fundamental societal values are truly implicated. 
403 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1971).  
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Even if the government were able to show that the uncivil speech 
it seeks to prohibit would be disruptive to the purpose of its forum, 
it is not entirely clear whether and how far the government can go in 
proscribing such speech in an online public forum. The Supreme 
Court has not yet addressed this issue,125 and lower courts have 
offered conflicting guidance in the somewhat analogous context of 
city council, school board, and planning commission meetings.126  
Take, for example, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Leonard v. 
Robinson, where the court ruled in favor of a citizen arrested for 
saying “god damn” while addressing a local township board 
meeting.127 Even though the township supervisor apparently took 
offense at the speaker’s use of “the Lord’s name in vain,” the court 
found that the supervisor had not ruled the speaker was out of order 
and that profane speech alone was not sufficiently disruptive to 
justify its curtailment.128 The court did not explain, however, how 
much disruption a speaker must cause in order for government to 
prohibit profane speech in a limited public forum. Instead, the court 
simply admonished that “[p]rohibiting Leonard from coupling an 
expletive to his political speech is clearly unconstitutional,”129 and 
noted that “[e]ven those who advocate the most narrow 
interpretation of the freedom of speech agree that in a democratic 
forum like a township meeting, the state should abstain from 
regulating speech.”130 
Another recent example is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Norse 
v. City of Santa Cruz.131 In Norse, a divided three-judge panel held 
that the city did not violate a citizen’s First Amendment rights by 
ejecting him from two city council meetings: one in 2004 where he 
paraded around the council chambers in protest and another in 2002 
where he silently gave a Nazi-style salute after the Mayor ordered 
 
 125. Other than in the school context, see, e.g., Bethel School District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 
675 (1986), the Supreme Court has not decided a limited public forum case involving 
restrictions on speech directed at incivility.  
 126. See Paul D. Wilson & Jennifer K. Alcarez, But It’s My Turn to Speak! When Can 
Unruly Speakers at Public Hearings Be Forced to Leave or Be Quiet?, 41 URB. LAW. 579, 594–
95 (2009). 
 127. 477 F.3d 347, 351 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 128. Id. at 352, 359–60. 
 129. Id. at 360. 
 130. Id. at 357. 
 131. 586 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 
598 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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that the time for open comment had expired.132 The case went up to 
the Ninth Circuit twice. Initially the Ninth Circuit held that Norse’s 
§ 1983 claim could proceed because the city had not shown that his 
actions were disruptive.133 On appeal the second time, the panel 
unanimously found that the city had acted reasonably in ejecting 
Norse when he led a parade in the council chambers. The panel was 
divided, however, on whether Norse’s Nazi-style salute was 
disruptive. Dissenting Judge A. Wallace Tashima explained why he 
deemed the ejection to be impermissible viewpoint discrimination: 
It is uncontroverted that Norse’s Nazi salute lasted only a second 
or two and, in the course of rendering that salute, Norse uttered no 
word or other sound . . . . In fact, a close reading of the majority 
opinion shows that it does not hold that Norse’s conduct was, 
itself, disruptive. Thus, there was no justification for the Mayor to 
eject Norse from the meeting for being disruptive. On the contrary, 
the record clearly supports the inference that Norse was ejected 
from the 2002 meeting because the Mayor and Council disagreed 
with (and intensely and overtly disliked) his viewpoint. . . . [T]here 
is ample evidence in the record to support a finding that Norse was 
removed because of his viewpoint–because Council members 
detested being characterized as acting Nazi-like.134  
Apart from their disagreement over whether the city’s actions 
constituted viewpoint discrimination, neither the majority nor the 
dissent in Norse defined what “disruption” entails in the public 
meeting context or offered guidance as to what constitutes 
reasonable government restrictions aimed at ensuring decorum. 
Given that the Ninth Circuit recently announced that it would 
rehear the case en banc,135 perhaps the Norse case will provide such 
guidance.  
It may very well be that public meetings are unique in the way 
that private speech can be disruptive to the government’s purpose in 
opening the forum. While many public bodies have opened up their 
meetings to private speakers, the meetings have a larger—and 
 
 132. Id. at 698–99. 
 133. Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 118 F. App’x 177, 178 (9th Cir. 2004). The council’s 
rules authorized removal by the Sergeant at Arms of any person who uses “language tending to 
bring the council or any council member into contempt, or any person who interrupts and 
refuses to keep quiet . . . or otherwise disrupts the proceedings of the council.” Id. 
 134. Norse, 586 F.3d at 701 (Tashima, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 135. Norse, 598 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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perhaps more pressing—purpose: to conduct the government’s 
business. At public meetings, officials must take in new information, 
debate the government’s business, and vote on how to proceed. 
When the expressive activities of private individuals occur within 
close physical proximity to the public body, it is reasonable to 
conclude that those activities can be disruptive to the purpose of the 
forum. Norse’s parade in the Santa Cruz City Council’s chamber is 
one such example.  
In the online context, however, disruption is rarely an all-or-
nothing affair. Although commentators have observed an increase in 
profane and abusive speech online, especially when speakers believe 
they are anonymous,136 it is unlikely that such speech will defeat the 
purpose of the online forum. Like water flowing around a rock, 
speech typically continues unabated online.137 Moreover, the 
“captive audience” rationale,138 which sometimes justifies greater 
deference to the government, is absent in the online context because 
participants in an online forum can simply ignore or “read past” the 
problematic speech. 
As discussed above, in order to be able to impose content-based 
limitations in a public forum, the government must be vigilant in 
applying its putative restrictions. In other words, the government 
must ensure that the forum contains only speech that is within the 
stated content boundaries. If it fails to do so, it will no longer be 
 
 136. See Adam N. Joinson, Disinhibition and the Internet, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE 
INTERNET 75, 79–81 (Jayne Gachenback ed., 2d ed. 2007); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas 
F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 
1575 (2007) (observing that “[s]ince the Internet magnifies the number of anonymous 
speakers, it also magnifies the likelihood of false and abusive speech”). 
 137. Some scholars, however, are examining whether certain forms of degrading and 
harassing speech online are causing individuals to curtail their participation in online forums. 
See Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 373, 391 (2009). 
 138. The “captive audience” rationale underlies the claim that a state may legitimately 
restrict speech where distasteful expression is thrust upon an unwilling or unsuspecting 
recipient “in order to protect the sensitive from otherwise unavoidable exposure.” Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). The Court has applied the rationale to uphold speech 
restrictions on sending mail to citizens’ houses, Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t., 397 U.S. 
728 (1970), radio broadcasts, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), and face-to-face 
speech directed at people entering an abortion clinic, Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
However, the Court has instructed that “[t]he ability of government . . . to shut off discourse 
solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon a showing that substantial 
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.” Cohen, 403 U.S. at 
21. 
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able to enforce those limitations.139 Because even the most precise 
civility guidelines suffer from some degree of vagueness and 
invariably require subjective assessment, it would be exceedingly 
difficult for the government to show that it has been consistent in 
keeping out uncivil speech. This challenge is especially pronounced 
in the online context where the volume of private speech can be 
overwhelming for website administrators to monitor.140 
In sum, the public forum doctrine presents significant challenges 
for the government when it restricts private speech on its websites. 
Not unlike private website operators, the government does not want 
its online forums to be used for discriminatory, violent, partisan, or 
otherwise inflammatory speech. Given the prevalence of profane, 
abusive, and irrelevant speech on the Internet,141 this is no idle 
concern for government officials who are tasked with maintaining 
online forums.142 But unlike private website operators, the 
government’s efforts to moderate public discourse must comport 
with the First Amendment and other constitutional limitations.143 
The public forum doctrine has faced considerable criticism over 
the years because of its arcane rules and inflexible categories,144 
which leave courts with little ability to calibrate the doctrine to 
account for a forum’s specific context and purpose. This has left the 
government with some unappealing alternatives when it evaluates 
 
 139. See supra note 110. 
 140. See generally Cliff Lampe & Paul Resnick, Slash(dot) and Burn: Distributed 
Moderation in a Large Online Conversation Space, Paper presented at CHI 2004, Vienna, 
Austria (April 24–29, 2004), http://presnick.people.si.umich.edu/papers/chi04/ 
LampeResnick.pdf (last accessed Feb. 21, 2011). 
 141. See, e.g., Diane Mapes, Anonymity Opens Up Split Personality Zone, MSNBC (Sept. 
24, 2008, 8:50m), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26837911/; Mattathias Schwartz, The 
Trolls Among Us, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 3, 2008, at 24, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/03/magazine/ 03trolls-t.html?_r=1. 
 142. This is not to say that such speech is not an important and continuing issue for 
government in the offline context as well. See, e.g., Andrea Damewood, Council May Clarify 
Rules After Outburst, THE COLUMBIAN (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.columbian.com/ 
news/ 2010/sep/17/council-may-clarify-rules-after-outburst/ (reporting that the City 
Council in Vancouver, WA is discussing revamping its guidelines about content and decorum 
in the way citizens address elected officials). 
 143. Given government’s uniquely powerful position within society, it is entirely proper 
to hold it to a higher standard. 
 144. See, e.g., Post, supra note 5, at 1715 (“[T]hese rules [governing the public forum 
doctrine] have proliferated to such an extent as to render the doctrine virtually impermeable to 
common sense. The doctrine has in fact become a serious obstacle not only to sensitive First 
Amendment analysis, but also to a realistic appreciation of the government’s requirements in 
controlling its own property.”). 
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whether to allow private speech on its websites: it can exclude private 
speech entirely,145 leave its online forums unmoderated,146 or create 
very narrow subject- and purpose-based categories in order to avoid 
claims of viewpoint discrimination. 
While there may be compelling reasons to adapt the public 
forum doctrine to account for how people actually assemble and 
communicate,147 the Supreme Court has not been willing to 
entertain such a reconceptualization of the doctrine. Instead, the 
Court has created a whole new doctrine to deal with the problems 
created by the public forum doctrine. 
III. THE EVOLVING GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE 
The general principle that the government may not engage in 
viewpoint discrimination in a public or non-public forum does not 
apply when the government itself is speaking.148 Pursuant to the 
government speech doctrine, when the speech is the government’s, 
the First Amendment’s limitations on government censorship fall 
away.149 Indeed, “it is plausible to view the development of the 
‘government speech doctrine’ in large part as an effort to relieve the 
government of the suffocating demands of the prohibition on 
viewpoint discrimination.”150 Yet the government speech doctrine 
presents a paradox. While non-neutral speech by the government is 
“integral to democratic society,” it is also “potentially subversive of 
 
 145. This draconian approach also applies in the social networking context as well. See 
Debra Cassens Weiss, California Town Abandons Facebook Page Amid Legal Concerns, ABA 
JOURNAL (Aug. 24, 2010, 4:30am), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
california_town_abandons_facebook_page_amid_legal_concerns (reporting that city of 
Redondo Beach cancelled its Facebook page due to First Amendment concerns). 
 146. The government can, of course, prohibit speech that falls outside First Amendment 
protection, such as obscenity. 
 147. See, e.g., Dolan, supra note 99, at 97–100; Gey, supra note 7, at 1538–39; 
Nunziato, supra note 33, at 1160–70.  
 148. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009). 
 149. Other constitutional limitations, however, apply to the government when it is 
speaking. See id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring) ( “[E]ven if the Free Speech Clause neither 
restricts nor protects government speech, government speakers are bound by the 
Constitution’s other proscriptions, including those supplied by the Establishment and Equal 
Protection Clauses.”). 
 150. Steven D. Smith, Why is Government Speech Problematic? The Unnecessary Problem, 
the Unnoticed Problem, and the Big Problem, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 945, 949 (2010). 
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core First Amendment values.”151 “The power to teach, inform and 
lead is also the power to indoctrinate, distort judgment, and 
perpetuate the current regime.”152 
One would think that such a powerful and potentially distortive 
doctrine must have developed over many years, through thoughtful 
consideration of the respective interests and policies involved. This is 
not, however, how the government speech doctrine arose. 
A. The Doctrine’s Genesis 
The constitutional principles we refer to today as the government 
speech doctrine saw their genesis in 1991 in Rust v. Sullivan, where 
the Supreme Court addressed whether the government could 
prohibit doctors who worked in federally-funded family planning 
clinics from providing advice about abortion.153 The Court held that 
the restrictions did not violate the First Amendment because the 
doctors were not private speakers entitled to free speech protections; 
rather, they spoke on behalf of the government and “when the 
Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is 
entitled to define the limits of that program.”154 
Intriguingly, the phrase “government speech” is absent from the 
four opinions that comprised the Rust decision.155 Nevertheless, over 
the next decade the Court clarified its nascent doctrine in two cases 
involving challenges directed at university funding of student 
activities. In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of 
Virginia, the Court held that the university’s refusal to fund a 
 
 151. David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in 
Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 702 (1992). 
 152. Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government 
Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863, 865 (1979). 
 153. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). There were some hints of the doctrine in earlier decisions, see, 
e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 n.7 (1973) 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“Government is not restrained by the First Amendment from 
controlling its own expression.”); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1990) (“If 
every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with 
which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the public would be limited to those 
in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it radically transformed.”), but 
it was largely inchoate until Rust. 
 154. Rust, 500 U.S. at 194. 
 155. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion and Justice Blackmun filed a 
dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall joined and in which Justices Stevens and 
O’Connor joined in part. Justices Stevens and O’Connor also filed separate dissenting 
opinions. 
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student-run Christian newspaper was unconstitutional viewpoint 
discrimination.156 While the Court acknowledged in Rosenberger that 
the government cannot compel private speech, it cited Rust for the 
proposition that “[w]hen the government disburses public funds to 
private entities to convey a governmental message,” it is “entitled to 
say what it wishes.”157 In Board of Regents of the University of 
Wisconsin System v. Southworth, the Court rejected a challenge 
brought by students who claimed that the university violated their 
First Amendment rights because it used their mandatory student 
activity fee to support student organizations whose viewpoints they 
found objectionable.158 Relying on Rust, the Court held that the 
university was not seeking to encourage diverse private speech; 
rather, it was using the student funds to advance its own message 
and therefore was not constrained by the First Amendment’s free 
speech protections. According to Justice Kennedy, “[w]hen the 
government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to 
advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the 
electorate and the political process for its advocacy.”159  
Ten years after its decision in Rust, the Court made clear that the 
principles it had articulated in Rust and developed in Rosenberger 
and Southworth were based on the concept of government speech.160 
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of a statute that prohibited the Legal Services 
Corporation (“LSC”), a federally-funded legal aid program, from 
representing clients who sought to challenge existing welfare laws.161 
Like Rust, Velazquez involved a compelled-speech challenge. Unlike 
Rust, however, the Court held that the restrictions on speech were 
unconstitutional:  
We have said that viewpoint-based funding decisions can be 
sustained in instances in which the government is itself the speaker, 
or instances, like Rust, in which the government “used private 
 
 156. 515 U.S. 819, 834–35 (1995). 
 157. Id. at 833. 
 158. 529 U.S. 217, 220–21 (2000). 
 159. Id. at 235. 
 160. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“The Court in Rust did 
not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under 
Title X amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, 
however, we have explained Rust on this understanding.”).  
 161. Id. at 536. 
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speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own 
program.” . . . [T]he LSC program was designed to facilitate 
private speech, not to promote a governmental message. Congress 
funded LSC grantees to provide attorneys to represent the interests 
of indigent clients. . . . The advice from the attorney to the client 
and the advocacy by the attorney to the courts cannot be classified 
as governmental speech even under a generous understanding of 
the concept. In this vital respect this suit is distinguishable from 
Rust.162 
Although the Court held that the restrictions at issue in 
Velazquez were not entitled to permissive treatment pursuant to the 
government speech doctrine, it reaffirmed Rust’s special treatment of 
government speech under the First Amendment.163  
Four years later, the Court further clarified this carve-out in 
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, where it considered a First 
Amendment challenge to the Department of Agriculture’s “Beef. It’s 
What’s for Dinner” promotional campaign that was funded by a 
mandatory assessment paid by beef producers.164 In Johanns, the 
Court unanimously held that the government can compel private 
speakers to pay for government speech, noting that “[c]itizens may 
challenge compelled support of private speech, but have no First 
Amendment right not to fund government speech.”165 The justices 
disagreed, however, on the question of whether the government 
must identify itself as the source of that speech in order to claim 
protection under the government speech doctrine.166  
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, concluded that the 
government had no affirmative duty to identify itself as the source. 
Instead, he reasoned that government need only demonstrate that it 
established the overall message to be communicated and controlled 
what was ultimately disseminated;167 “[n]o more is required.”168 
 
 162. Id. at 541–43 (internal citations omitted). 
 163. Id. at 542. 
 164. 544 U.S. 550, 554 (2005). Some beef producers did not want to participate in the 
generic promotional campaign, believing that they could be more effective on their own. Id. at 
555. 
 165. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562; id. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The first point of 
certainty is the need to recognize the legitimacy of government’s power to speak despite 
objections by dissenters whose taxes or other exactions necessarily go in some measure to 
putting the offensive message forward to be heard.”). 
 166. The ads at issue in Johanns did not mention the government, but instead included 
the tag line, “Funded by America’s Beef Producers.” Id. at 555 (majority opinion). 
 167. Id. at 560–62, 564. 
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According to Justice Scalia, the promotional campaign was 
government speech because “[t]he Secretary of Agriculture, a 
politically accountable official, oversees the program, appoints and 
dismisses the key personnel, and retains absolute veto power over the 
advertisements’ content, right down to the wording.”169 Justice 
Scalia also noted that “Congress, of course, retains oversight 
authority, not to mention the ability to reform the program at any 
time.”170 
In dissent, Justice Souter took the majority to task for its 
willingness to cast the First Amendment’s safeguards aside without 
requiring that the government take any meaningful actions to ensure 
that it could be held accountable for its expressive activities: “It 
means nothing that Government officials control the message if that 
fact is never required to be made apparent to those who get the 
message.”171 Justice Souter, who had joined the majority in Rust, 
went on to make it clear that he viewed political accountability as 
essential to the doctrine’s favorable treatment under the First 
Amendment. “Unless the putative government speech appears to be 
coming from the government, its governmental origin cannot 
possibly justify the burden on the First Amendment interests of the 
dissenters targeted to pay for it.”172 
But the problem with the Court’s decision in Johanns goes even 
deeper. Not only did the majority not require that the government 
make plain that it was the source of the speech at issue,173 it 
countenanced outright dissembling by the government. As Justice 
Souter observed in his dissent: 
[E]xperience under the Act demonstrates how effectively the 
Government has masked its role in producing the ads. Most 
obviously, many of them include the tagline, “[f]unded by 
America’s Beef Producers,” which all but ensures that no one 
reading them will suspect that the message comes from the 
National Government. . . . Why would a person reading a beef ad 
 
 168. Id. at 564. 
 169. Id. at 563. 
 170. Id. at 563–64. 
 171. Id. at 578 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 172. Id. at 578–79. 
 173. On this point, the majority in Johanns was arguably following Rust, where the Court 
appears to have been unconcerned with the fact that the regulations did not require that the 
health care providers explain to patients that the government was dictating their response to 
questions about abortion. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 180 (1991). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/21/2011 12:24 PM 
1981 Government Speech and Online Forums 
 2015 
think Uncle Sam was trying to make him eat more steak? . . . [T]he 
Court nowhere addresses how, or even whether, the benefits of 
allowing government to mislead taxpayers by concealing its 
sponsorship of expression outweigh the additional imposition on 
First Amendment rights that results from it. Indeed, the Court 
describes no benefits from its approach and gives no reason to 
think First Amendment doctrine should accommodate the 
Government’s subterfuge.174  
Indeed, the test for government speech the Court articulated in 
Rust and clarified in Johanns requires almost nothing from the 
government beyond what it is already doing—controlling or 
restricting speech—while at the same time significantly undercutting 
the rationale for granting the government favorable treatment under 
the First Amendment in the first place, namely, accountability to the 
electorate as a check on government overreaching.175  
Any possibility that the court would rethink its approach and 
require that the government take affirmative steps to identify itself as 
the source of speech for which it claims entitlement under the 
government speech doctrine was put to rest in City of Pleasant Grove 
v. Summum.176  
In Summum, a Utah-based religious order requested permission 
to erect a “stone monument” inscribed with the “Seven Aphorisms 
of SUMMUM” in Pioneer Park in the City of Pleasant Grove, 
Utah.177 Although the park contained fifteen permanent displays at 
the time, at least eleven of which were donated by private groups or 
individuals, the city denied the request, claiming that “its practice 
was to limit monuments in the Park to those that ‘either (1) directly 
relate to the history of Pleasant Grove, or (2) were donated by 
groups with longstanding ties to the Pleasant Grove community.’”178 
The following year, the city passed a resolution formally adopting 
this practice while adding other criteria, such as safety and aesthetics, 
 
 174. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 577–79 & n.8 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 175. For a discussion of why transparency and government accountability are essential, see 
infra Part IV. 
 176. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
 177. Id. at 1129. “According to Summum doctrine, the Seven Aphorisms were inscribed 
on the original tablets handed down by God to Moses on Mount Sinai.” Id at 1129 n.1. 
 178. Id. at 1130. The permanent monuments in the park included “an historic granary, a 
wishing well, the City’s first fire station, a September 11 monument, and a Ten 
Commandments monument donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1971.” Id. at 1129. 
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to its monument policy. After the district court denied Summum’s 
request for a preliminary injunction ordering the city to permit it to 
erect the monument, the Tenth Circuit reversed, concluding “that 
public parks have traditionally been regarded as public forums, [and] 
the City could not reject the Seven Aphorisms monument unless it 
had a compelling justification that could not be served by more 
narrowly tailored means.”179 
The Supreme Court, in its first unanimous decision applying the 
government speech doctrine, held that the city’s selection of 
permanent monuments in the park was entitled to special treatment 
as government speech. In doing so, the Court instructed that the 
public forum doctrine was the wrong lens through which to view the 
case.180 Speculating as to the results that would follow if courts 
applied public forum principles, the Court warned: 
If government entities must maintain viewpoint neutrality in their 
selection of donated monuments, they must either “brace 
themselves for an influx of clutter” or face the pressure to remove 
longstanding and cherished monuments. . . . The obvious truth of 
the matter is that if public parks were considered to be traditional 
public forums for the purpose of erecting privately donated 
monuments, most parks would have little choice but to refuse all 
such donations. And where the application of forum analysis would 
lead almost inexorably to closing of the forum, it is obvious that 
forum analysis is out of place.181 
This being the case, the Court was left with what it perceived to 
be a stark choice: either give the city freedom to engage in viewpoint 
discrimination or face a world without permanent monuments on 
government property. Perhaps not surprisingly,182 the Court chose 
 
 179. Id. at 1130 (citing City of Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 483 F.3d 1044, 1054 (10th 
Cir. 2007)). The Tenth Circuit had previously found a similar Ten Commandments 
monument in a different city park in Utah to be private rather than government speech. See 
Summum v. Ogden, 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 180. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1137 (“public forum principles . . . are out of place in 
the context of this case”) (quoting United States v. Am. Library Ass’n., Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 
205 (2003)). 
 181. Id. at 1138 (internal citation omitted). 
 182. See Norton & Citron, supra note 83, at 915 (noting that “pragmatism often drives 
the Court’s First Amendment doctrine”); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism 
in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737, 739 (2002) (observing that “the 
constitutional law of free speech seems on the whole, though certainly not in every respect, to 
be a product of the judges’ (mainly they are United States Supreme Court Justices) trying to 
reach results that are reasonable in light of their consequences”). 
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the former approach, concluding that the city’s decisions regarding 
which monuments to approve were government speech.183  
While the Court’s holding characterizing the city’s selection of 
monuments as government speech received unanimous support from 
the justices, they did not agree on whether the government must 
take steps to identify itself as the speaker or even whether the 
doctrine requires that a reasonable observer would understand the 
expression to be the government’s speech. Instead, Justice Alito, 
who authored the opinion for the Court, appears to have cobbled 
together several rationales in order to garner support from the 
concurring justices.  
Citing Johanns, Justice Alito wrote that the city “‘effectively 
controlled’ the messages sent by the monuments in the Park by 
exercising ‘final approval authority’ over their selection.”184 Although 
he did not state that anything more was required, he went on to 
note that park visitors would likely conclude that the city “intends 
the monument to speak on its behalf” because the city “owns and 
manages” the park where the monuments are located and the park 
“is linked to the City’s identity.”185 But Justice Alito did not require 
that the government take any affirmative steps to identify itself as the 
speaker,186 nor did he state that the Court’s holding was based on an 
assessment of the circumstances involved in the display of 
monuments in the park, such as the location of the monuments, past 
practice by the city, or other cues that might lead a reasonable 
 
 183. In fact, the Court saw the decision as an easy one: “There may be situations in 
which it is difficult to tell whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is 
providing a forum for private speech, but this case does not present such a situation. 
Permanent monuments displayed on public property typically represent government speech.” 
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132. 
 184. Id. at 1134 (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–61 
(2005)). 
 185. Id. 
 186. The Court rejected Summum’s suggestion that it “require a government entity 
accepting a privately donated monument to go through a formal process of adopting a 
resolution publicly embracing ‘the message’ that the monument conveys.” Id. at 1134. This 
conclusion also seems to be driven, at least in part, by pragmatic concerns. See id. (“The parks 
of this country contain thousands of donated monuments that government entities have used 
for their own expressive purposes, usually without producing the sort of formal documentation 
that respondent now says is required to escape Free Speech Clause restrictions. Requiring all of 
these jurisdictions to go back and proclaim formally that they adopt all of these monuments as 
their own expressive vehicles would be a pointless exercise that the Constitution does not 
mandate.”). 
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observer to conclude that the government was acting in its capacity 
as speaker.  
While Justice Alito conceded that it was a “legitimate concern 
that the government speech doctrine not be used as a subterfuge for 
favoring certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint,”187 
he did not seek to reduce that danger by infusing the government 
speech doctrine with requirements that would actually lead to 
meaningful governmental accountability. Nor did he embrace the 
approach proposed by Justice Souter in his concurring opinion: that 
the Court “ask whether a reasonable and fully informed observer 
would understand the expression to be government speech, as 
distinct from private speech the government chooses to oblige by 
allowing the monument to be placed on public land.”188  
As a result, the Summum decision “seemingly opens the door for 
the government to engage in viewpoint discrimination in any public 
forum just by adopting a private message as its own.”189 Erwin 
Chemerinsky describes how this subterfuge on the part of the 
government might play out: 
Imagine that a city allowed pro-war demonstrators to use a public 
park, but refused access to anti-war demonstrators. This would be 
clearly unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. . . . 
After the Summum decision, though, there is nothing to keep the 
government from announcing that it was adopting the private pro-
war demonstrators’ message as its own speech. Once it did so, then 
the First Amendment would not apply and the requirement for 
content-neutrality would have no application. Justice Alito’s 
opinion would in no way preclude the government from engaging 
in this blatantly unconstitutional form of viewpoint 
discrimination.190 
Extending Professor Chemerinsky’s hypothetical, it is not 
difficult to imagine the Summum case with a slightly different set of 
facts. Parks are expensive to maintain. So, instead of owning a public 
 
 187. Id. at 1134. 
 188. See id. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[T]he best approach that occurs to me is 
to ask whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would understand the expression to be 
government speech, as distinct from private speech the government chooses to oblige by 
allowing the monument to be placed on public land.”). 
 189. Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the Right, Perhaps Sharply to the Right, 12 GREEN 
BAG 2d 413, 426 (2009). 
 190. Id. at 426–27. 
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park, imagine that the city creates a virtual park, complete with 
pictures of trees and grass.191 On one part of the website the city 
invites members of the community to post their own virtual 
“monuments,” in the form of text, audio, or video. Of course, it is 
likely that some of these virtual monuments will contain speech that 
the city will want to reject. Are there any limits to what our 
hypothetical city can do in selecting, editing, or removing these 
contributions from the public? Can the city engage in viewpoint 
discrimination simply by adopting the private messages as its own? 
B. Government Speech on Government Websites 
Surprisingly, there are only a few judicial decisions addressing 
First Amendment challenges directed at speech on government 
websites, and none of the Supreme Court’s government speech cases 
to date have involved online speech. In fact, the Court’s government 
speech decisions have largely dealt with government restrictions in 
conventional forms of media such as print,192 broadcast,193 and the 
spoken word.194 Lower courts, however, have had to deal with 
disputes over speech restrictions on government websites and they 
have been increasingly looking to the Court’s government speech 
cases for guidance.  
In the two earliest cases to address speech restrictions on 
government websites, the courts applied public forum analysis and 
concluded that the government websites at issue were non-public 
forums. In Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, the City of 
Cookeville operated a website that included a “local links” page 
containing a list of hyperlinks to local businesses.195 The Putnam Pit, 
 
 191. The City of Pleasant Grove does in fact have a website with pictures of trees, grass, 
and, given that the city is in Utah, mountains. PLEASANT GROVE, http://www.plgrove.org/ 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
 192. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (dispute over whether selection of monuments 
with engraved speech was government speech); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413–14, 
425–26 (2006) (dispute over whether prosecutor’s memorandum criticizing the police was 
government speech); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (dispute 
over whether advertising campaign in print and on television was government speech). 
 193. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 553 (television and print advertising). 
 194. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 202–03 (1991) (health care providers’ discussion 
of abortion with patients at family planning clinics). 
 195. 221 F.3d 834, 841 (6th Cir. 2000) (Putnam Pit I). “A hyperlink (or link) is a word, 
group of words, or image that you can click on to jump to a new document or a new section 
within the current document.” HTML Links, W3SCHOOLS, 
http://www.w3schools.com/HTML/html_links.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
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an independent newspaper and website that criticized corruption and 
malfeasance in Cookeville, requested that the city add a link to its 
website. In response to the request, the city, which at the time had 
no policy regarding hyperlinks, devised a policy that limited links first 
to non-profit entities and then to organizations that “would 
promote the economic welfare, tourism, and industry of the city.”196 
When the city continued to refuse to add the requested link to The 
Putnam Pit, the plaintiff sued, claiming that the city had established 
a designated public forum when it posted links to private websites 
and its refusal to link to his website constituted impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination.197  
Following the prevailing approach for dealing with disputes over 
speech on government property, the Sixth Circuit looked to the 
public forum doctrine to decide the case.198 The court ultimately 
determined that the city’s website was a non-public forum, but it 
worried that the city’s purported policy left too much discretion to 
the government. Because the Sixth Circuit found that evidence 
existed that the city refused to link to The Putnam Pit because it did 
not like the “controversial views” espoused on the website, the court 
remanded the case to the district court to determine if the city had 
engaged in viewpoint discrimination.199 After a jury returned a 
verdict for the city, finding that the plaintiff did not meet the city’s 
criteria for inclusion on the city’s links page, the Sixth Circuit 
declined to overturn the verdict.200  
Another early case involved a state employment website. In 
Cahill v. Texas Workforce Commission, the plaintiff sought to post 
comments and other information about employers on the Texas 
Workforce Commission’s physical bulletin boards and website.201 As 
in Putnam Pit, the court held that the website was a non-public 
 
 196. Putnam Pit I, 221 F.3d. at 841. 
 197. Id. at 841–42.  
 198. Id. at 842 (“The public forum analysis, which has traditionally applied to tangible 
property owned by the government, is an appropriate means to analyze [the plaintiff’s] 
claim.”). 
 199. Id. at 845. 
 200. Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 76 F. App’x 607, 614 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(Putnam Pit II) (“Because we hold that the jury’s finding that The Putnam Pit website was 
not eligible under the City’s criteria was supported by the evidence, we need not address 
whether Cookeville denied a link to The Putnam Pit solely on the basis of viewpoint.”). 
 201. 121 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1024 (E.D. Tex. 2000), aff’d sub nom., Cahill v. Texas, 263 
F.3d 163 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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forum and the state had properly limited access to “people seeking 
workers or jobs.”202 The court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that 
the exclusion of former employees was viewpoint discrimination 
because such speakers were not “member[s] of the class of speakers 
for whose especial benefit the forum was created.”203 While the court 
noted that “Mr. Cahill may have a helpful suggestion” for the 
operation of the state’s website—presumably a suggestion that 
would have allowed job seekers to better evaluate employers—the 
court concluded that his exclusion was a content-neutral restriction 
based on speaker-status, not viewpoint discrimination.204 
Both Putnam Pit and Cahill would likely have been even easier 
wins for the government under the government speech doctrine. 
Recall that pursuant to the government speech doctrine, the 
government is free to engage in viewpoint discrimination so long as 
it can show that it “effectively controls” the message being 
conveyed.205 Because the City of Cookeville chose to use its website 
to promote local tourism and economic welfare, albeit a purpose it 
offered after the fact,206 under the government speech doctrine it 
would have been free to link to any websites that it thought best 
promoted its message. Even if the city were to refuse to link to The 
Putnam Pit because it disfavored the newspaper’s viewpoint, it 
would be able to do so. Similarly, the Texas Workforce Commission, 
which maintained full control over the content on its website, could 
have refused Mr. Cahill’s request for any reason, including pursuant 
to a policy that allowed former employees to post only positive 
reviews about their employers. 
A shift away from public forum principles to the far more lenient 
government speech doctrine occurred several years later, after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Johanns demonstrated the utility of the 
Court’s government speech principles to government websites.207 In 
 
 202. Id. at 1026. 
 203. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 
(1985)). 
 204. Id. at 1027. 
 205. Note, however, that both cases predated the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johanns 
and Summum. 
 206. Given the Supreme Court’s decision in Summum, post-hoc rationalizations do not 
appear to preclude the government from asserting that its expressive decisions are government 
speech. 
 207. Even after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johanns and Summum, however, lower 
courts still occasionally applied the public forum doctrine to speech on government websites 
DO NOT DELETE 3/21/2011 12:24 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
2022 
Page v. Lexington County School District One, a South Carolina 
school district passed a resolution opposing pending legislation that 
the district believed would undermine funding for public 
education.208 The district communicated its position on the school’s 
website, where it also posted links to documents that expressed 
opposition to the bill, and through email and letters to parents and 
school employees that included information written by private 
citizens who opposed the legislation.209 Randall Page, a vocal 
proponent of the legislation, requested “‘equal access’” to the 
district’s “‘informational distribution system,’” including its email 
system and website.210 
When the school district rejected his request, Mr. Page filed suit 
claiming, inter alia, that the district’s website was a public forum 
because it contained links to private organizations.211 On appeal after 
the district court’s dismissal of the claims, the Fourth Circuit turned 
immediately to the government speech doctrine.212 Citing Johanns, 
the court focused on whether the school district had established the 
message being conveyed and exercised effective control over the 
content and dissemination of the message.213 Finding that the school 
district “continuously and unambiguously communicated a 
consistent message” and “wholly controlled its own website, 
retaining the right and ability to exclude any link at any time,” the 
court held that the links on the district’s website were government 
speech.214 Perhaps foreshadowing cases to come, the Fourth Circuit 
remarked in dicta that had the district’s website been “a type of ‘chat 
room’ or ‘bulletin board’ in which private viewers could express 
 
without addressing the government speech doctrine, presumably because the defendants in 
those cases did not raise the issue of government speech. See Hogan v. Twp. of Haddon, 278 
Fed. Appx. 98 (3rd Cir. 2008) (holding that township website was a non-public forum); 
Vargas v. City of Salinas, 205 P.3d 207 (Cal. 2009) (holding that city website was a non-
public forum). 
 208. 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 209. Id. at 278. 
 210. Id. at 277–78. 
 211. Id. at 279–80. The plaintiff also argued that “‘[b]y disseminating varying opinions 
from non-District employees via its e-mail system, website, facsimile machines, and newsletters, 
the District has created and has continuously maintained public fora.’” Id. 
 212. Id. at 280 (remarking that “Government’s own speech . . . is exempt from First 
Amendment scrutiny”) (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 554 U.S. 550, 553 
(2005)).  
 213. Id. at 281. 
 214. Id. at 284–85. 
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opinions or post information, the issue would, of course, be 
different.”215 
Although courts often grapple with how to characterize a 
government website containing hyperlinks—primarily due to a lack 
of understanding about how the “Web” works216—the facts in Page 
made for a relatively straightforward application of the government 
speech doctrine. When a governmental entity states a clear position 
on a public issue and creates pages on its website supporting that 
position, the fact that those pages link out to private websites should 
not change the nature of who is doing the communicating.  
The harder case arises when the government has taken no public 
position, communicated no policy, and provided no objective cues as 
to its intent to express a message. Indeed, this creates the potential 
for government subterfuge that Professor Chemerinsky identified 
after the Court’s decision in Summum.217 Chemerinsky’s concern 
was that the government could freely engage in viewpoint 
discrimination merely by offering post hoc rationalizations to justify 
its discrimination. 
We see this danger manifest itself in a recent case involving a 
town website in New Hampshire. In Sutliffe v. Epping School 
District, 218 the town maintained a website that provided information 
about the town’s government, including its boards and commissions, 
town meetings, and other government-sponsored activities. The 
town’s Board of Selectmen determined what materials would appear 
on the website and over the years added hyperlinks “to the websites 
of ‘governmental agencies and certain civic organizations.’”219 
Although the town had been operating its website since the 1990s, 
the Board of Selectmen had no written or other formal policy that 
dictated what content was acceptable or unacceptable for the 
website.220 
 
 215. Id. at 284. 
 216. See Jeff Jarvis, The Link Economy v. The Content Economy, BUZZ MACHINE (June 18, 
2008, 10:00am), http://www.buzzmachine.com/2008/06/18/the-link-economy-v-the-
content-economy (observing that “the real value . . . is not content and information—both of 
which are now quickly commodified—but links, which are the new currency of media”).  
 217. Chemerinsky, supra note 189, at 426–27.  
 218. 584 F.3d 314 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 219. Id. at 322. 
 220. Id. at 338 (Torruella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
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In 2006, a local citizens group that advocated reduced spending 
and described itself as “‘a perennial thorn in [the Town’s] side,’”221 
along with its chairman Thomas Sutliffe and other members of the 
community, demanded that the Board of Selectmen provide the 
group with the opportunity to distribute its materials opposing town 
spending through the same channels the town was using, including 
the town’s website. When the board refused, the plaintiffs filed “suit 
alleg[ing] that [the] defendants violated [their] First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights by ‘creating fora . . . for the expression of their 
viewpoints regarding spending, while failing and refusing to allow 
the [plaintiffs] access to such fora in order to communicate their 
contrary viewpoints regarding spending.’”222  
While the town conceded that it did not have a formal policy for 
deciding what links to include, it argued that its practice in making 
such decisions “was always to ‘provide information to the citizenry of 
the Town on Town business.’ The only links that were permitted 
were ones that ‘would promote providing information about the 
Town,’ and any links that were ‘political or advocate[d] for certain 
candidates’ were not allowed.”223 After the plaintiffs filed their 
lawsuit, however, “the town adopted a written . . . policy that 
limited hyperlinks on [its] website to those for governmental 
agencies or ‘events and programs that are coordinated and/or 
sponsored by the Town of Epping.’”224 
On appeal, the First Circuit focused on the town’s actions in 
setting up the website and its control over the content and 
hyperlinks, noting that “[t]he Town created a website to convey 
information about the Town to its citizens and the outside world 
and, by choosing only certain hyperlinks to place on that website, 
communicated an important message about itself.”225 Citing to 
Summum and Johanns, the First Circuit concluded that “like the city 
in Summum, the Town defendants effectively controlled the content 
 
 221. Id. at 318. 
 222. Id. at 321. In their second amended complaint, the plaintiffs added a new set of 
allegations based on the town’s decision in 2007 to add a link on its website to the website for 
Speak Up, Epping!, a community event that “was intended to foster community spirit, civic 
discourse, and the organization of community-defined projects and action groups.” Id. at 322–
23. 
 223. Id. at 322. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 331. 
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of this message by exercising ‘“final approval authority” over the[ ] 
selection’ of the hyperlinks on the website.”226 
The Sutliffe case is similar to Summum in other respects as well. 
Like the City of Pleasant Grove, the Town of Epping’s lack of a clear 
policy regarding what private speech it permitted raised the danger 
that its refusal to link to the citizen group’s website was motivated 
by its distaste for the group’s viewpoint, rather than the town’s 
desire to maintain the purity of its own message—which in both 
Sutliffe and Summum was opaque at the time the government 
refused to allow the private parties to express themselves on 
government property. In dissent, Judge Torruella made this concern 
explicit: 
[T]he majority extends the doctrine to a situation where, in my 
view, it was not clear that the government was engaging in speech 
at the time it was acting, and only justified its actions after the fact. 
The majority’s position has the potential of permitting a 
governmental entity to engage in viewpoint discrimination in its 
own governmentally-owned channels so long as the governmental 
entity can cast its actions as its own speech after the fact. . . . It is 
nearly impossible to concoct examples of viewpoint discrimination 
on government channels that cannot otherwise be repackaged ex 
post as “government speech.”227 
Judge Torruella also criticized the majority for relying on 
political accountability as a restraint on government overreaching, 
noting that the government speech doctrine itself makes 
accountability less effective because it allows the government “to 
silence opposition by narrowing the fora in which opposing views 
may be expressed.”228 Indeed, “[t]his is akin to allowing the 
government ‘to fight freestyle, while requiring the other [side] to 
follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.’”229 Echoing Justice Souter’s 
concurrence in Summum, Judge Torruella stated that the 
government speech doctrine should turn on whether a “reasonable 
observer would construe the Town’s actions as government speech, 
 
 226. Id. (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009)). 
 227. Id. at 337 (Torruella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 228. Id. (arguing that “relief through political processes becomes further constrained by 
expanding the government’s ability to silence opposition by narrowing the fora in which 
opposing views may be expressed.”) 
 229. Id. at 338 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992)). 
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as opposed to the designation of a public forum or simple run-of-
the-mill viewpoint discrimination.”230 
Putnam Pit, Cahill, Page, and Sutliffe involved simple websites 
with no discernable means for direct public input. Yet even these 
relatively easy cases demonstrate the “legitimate concern that the 
government speech doctrine not be used as a subterfuge for favoring 
certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint.”231 As 
government websites become more interactive, thereby allowing the 
public to add its own voice to that of the government’s, courts will 
face an increasing challenge in determining when government is itself 
speaking and when it is simply abusing its power over private speech. 
The Fourth Circuit alluded to this challenge in Page v. Lexington 
County School District One,232 but no court has yet had to apply the 
government speech doctrine to an interactive government website. 
We can, however, draw some guidance from how courts have 
applied the government speech doctrine in analogous contexts. In 
fact, courts have been quite generous in finding the doctrine 
applicable where the government exercises control over which 
private speech is presented to the public.233 The Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School District illustrates this 
point.234 In Downs, a school district established a bulletin board to 
celebrate Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month and invited faculty and 
staff to post material on the board.235 After the school district refused 
to allow a teacher to post materials questioning the morality of 
homosexuality, the Ninth Circuit held that the bulletin board’s 
contents were government speech, noting that school officials had 
 
 230. Id. at 338 n.16. 
 231. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009). 
 232. 531 F.3d 275, 284 (4th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that in “a type of ‘chat room’ or 
‘bulletin board’ in which private viewers could express opinions or post information, the issue 
would, of course, be different”). 
 233.  See, e.g., Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 (selection of donated monuments held to be 
government speech); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 561 (2005) (approval 
of privately created advertising materials); Illinois Dunesland Pres. Soc'y v. Illinois Dept. of 
Natural Res., 584 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2367 (2010) 
(selection of brochures for display racks in Illinois Beach State Park); People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (selection of “party 
animal” statutes placed around Washington, DC); Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School 
District, 228 F.3d 1003, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000) (oversight over postings on school bulletin 
board celebrating Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month). 
 234.  228 F.3d 1003. 
 235.  Id. at 1005–06. 
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engaged in expressive activity by “either choosing not to speak or 
speaking through the very act of [removing the speech of others].”236  
The question, of course, is how much control over private speech 
must the government exercise in order to bring a case within the 
ambit of the government speech doctrine. According to the Ninth 
Circuit in Downs, it was sufficient that school officials “had authority 
over the bulletin boards’ content at all times,” even though there 
was evidence that they had not consistently exercised that 
authority.237  
Similarly, in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. 
Gittens,238 the D.C. Circuit held that the District of Columbia’s 
Commission on the Arts and Humanities was entitled to claim 
protection under the government speech doctrine because it retained 
the authority to approve the design of private art displayed 
throughout the city as part of its “Party Animals” sculpture 
program.239  
In Gittens, the city rejected an entry from the People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) that showed “a sad, shackled 
circus elephant” on the grounds that its portrayal of cruelty did not 
meet the city’s criterion that the sculptures be “festive and 
whimsical.”240 PETA argued that because the city had accepted other 
sculptures that were not festive, including tributes to the heroes and 
victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks and designs 
commemorating civil rights leaders, the city’s rejection was 
viewpoint discrimination.241 The D.C. Circuit found the city’s 
allegedly inconsistent application of its approval standards to be 
immaterial, holding that the city’s refusal to allow PETA’s sculpture 
was government speech:  
The Commission spoke when it determined which elephant and 
donkey models to include in the exhibition and which not to 
include. In using its “editorial discretion in the selection and 
presentation of” the elephants and donkeys, the Commission thus 
 
 236.  Id. at 1012. 
 237.  Id. at 1011. 
 238.  414 F.3d 23 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 239.  Id. at 30. The “Party Animals” program involved a city initiative to create temporary 
sidewalk sculpture displays of donkeys and elephants and was intended to showcase local 
artists, attract tourists and enliven the streets “with creative, humorous art.” Id. at 25. 
 240.  Id. at 26–27. 
 241.  Id. at 27. 
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“engage[d] in speech activity”; “compilation of the speech of third 
parties” is a communicative act.242 
As Downs and Gittens demonstrate, the government speech 
doctrine grants the government broad power to impose viewpoint-
based limitations on private speech in what would otherwise be 
public forums subject to strict First Amendment oversight. 
C. The Nature of Public-Government Discourse 
As courts begin to address disputes over government speech on 
interactive websites, they will quickly discover that the government 
speech doctrine rests on a set of questionable assumptions about 
how public discourse occurs. One such assumption is that speech 
must be either private or governmental. As discussed above, the 
characterization of speech as governmental is usually dispositive 
under the government speech doctrine. The problem with this 
binary approach, however, is that “much speech is the joint 
production of both government and private speakers and exists 
somewhere along a continuum, with pure private speech and pure 
government speech at each end.”243 As government websites become 
more interactive, the line between government and private speech 
will further blur. 
A second assumption underlying the government speech 
doctrine is that public discourse is asynchronous; that is, the speaker 
and audience do not interact in any meaningful way. This is a 
conception of government speech in which the government speaks 
and citizens listen. Embodying this mindset, the government speech 
doctrine is concerned only with a single moment in time when 
courts are expected to ask whether the government established and 
controlled what was disseminated.244 The doctrine is not concerned 
with how context and the passage of time shape the public’s 
understanding of who is speaking or what is being communicated. 
Unlike the broadcast model of speech (i.e., one-to-many) that 
predominates in the Court’s government speech cases, online speech 
 
 242.  Id. at 28 (quoting Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n V. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 
1998). 
 243. Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 607 (2008) (demonstrating the mixed nature of private and 
governmental speech in the context of specialty license plates). 
 244. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–62, 564 (2004). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/21/2011 12:24 PM 
1981 Government Speech and Online Forums 
 2029 
is considered a many-to-many form of synchronous communication 
that involves complex, multi-directional and multi-modal 
conversations.245 As Yochai Benkler observes in his seminal work on 
the Wealth of Networks: 
We are witnessing a fundamental change in how individuals can 
interact with their democracy and experience their role as 
citizens. . . . They are no longer constrained to occupy the role of 
mere readers, viewers, and listeners. They can be, instead, 
participants in a conversation. . . . The network allows all citizens to 
change their relationship to the public sphere. They no longer need 
be consumers and passive spectators. They can become creators and 
primary subjects. It is in this sense that the Internet 
democratizes.246 
While there is little interaction between the government and the 
public once the government has installed a monument on public 
property or broadcast an advertisement on television, the view that 
government speaks and the public merely listens makes little sense in 
the context of many government websites. The FCC’s 
Broadband.gov, which allows citizens to use real-time discussion 
tools to engage in a conversation with government officials, is an 
example of this profoundly important change in the nature of public-
government discourse and highlights the danger of extending the 
government speech doctrine to mixed private and governmental 
speech without adequate assurances of government accountability.247 
IV. LIMITING THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE 
As discussed in Part III, the Supreme Court’s government speech 
cases do not require that the government take affirmative steps to 
identify itself as the source of speech that it later claims as its own 
under the government speech doctrine. In fact, the circularity of the 
Court’s test for government speech is astonishing. If the government 
were not engaged in compelling or limiting private speech, there 
would be no dispute in the first place. The current test for 
government speech, which turns on whether the government 
 
 245. See BENKLER, supra note 38, at 241–72.  
 246. Id. at 272. 
 247. See Corbin, supra note 243, at 671 (concluding that “treating mixed speech as 
government speech upsets free speech values by allowing the government to escape 
accountability for its speech and by distorting the marketplace of ideas”).  
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“effectively controlled” the message,248 simply requires that the 
government be effective in doing the very thing that is the subject of 
the plaintiff’s First Amendment challenge. Indeed, the more 
rapacious the government is in controlling private speech, the greater 
will be its entitlement to claim special treatment under the 
government speech doctrine. 
The only limit on the doctrine that the Court has identified is 
the government’s “accountab[ility] to the electorate and the political 
process for its advocacy.”249 Yet the Court’s government speech cases 
do not explain what accountability means in this context, nor do 
they contain mechanisms for ensuring that any accountability is 
possible. The forms of accountability the Court likely envisions, 
namely voting, lobbying, and petitioning, will restrain the 
government from overreaching only if citizens are aware that the 
contested expression is the government’s. Without this knowledge 
on the part of the electorate, accountability is nothing but a hollow 
aspiration that serves only to mask the Court’s abdication of the First 
Amendment’s core free speech principles.  
This is all the more disturbing because the government has a 
long history of trying to obscure its role in influencing and 
controlling private speech.250 The government’s opportunities for 
 
 248. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560. Because the Supreme Court “has provided very little 
guidance as to what constitutes government speech,” Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 
F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2001), some lower courts have come up with their own tests that 
examine: 
(1) the central “purpose” of the program in which the speech in question occurs; 
(2) the degree of “editorial control” exercised by the government or private entities 
over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the “literal” speaker; and (4) 
whether the government or the private entity bears the “ultimate responsibility” for 
the content of the speech . . . 
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 
610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Wells, 257 F.3d at 1140–41. But see Chiras v. Miller, 432 
F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2005) (declining to apply the four-factor test). 
 249. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000); 
see also Johanns, 544 U.S. at 563–64 (noting that “Congress, of course, retains oversight 
authority, not to mention the ability to reform the program at any time”). 
 250. See, e.g., Johanns, 544 U.S. at 577–78 (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that 
“experience under the Act demonstrates how effectively the Government has masked its role in 
producing the ads”); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 
HASTINGS L.J. 983, 983–88 (2005) (noting government’s covert efforts to influence public 
debate); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National 
Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 233 (2008) (describing the government’s strategic use 
of leaks to influence public debate). For example, George W. Bush’s aides secretly paid 
$240,000 to columnist Armstrong Williams to promote the No Child Left Behind Act and 
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subterfuge will only increase as more speech moves from the physical 
to the virtual world, where there is truth to the adage captured in 
Peter Steiner’s famous cartoon in The New Yorker: “On the Internet, 
nobody knows you’re a dog.”251 Given the government’s increasing 
use of “emerging technologies that have dramatically altered 
expression’s speed, audience, collaborative nature, and 
anonymity,”252 it is critically important that the government speech 
doctrine ensure that government can actually be held accountable for 
its expressive activities. 
A. Ensuring that Government Can Be Held Accountable for Its 
Expressive Activities 
As other scholars have noted, to make accountability possible the 
government speech doctrine should be limited to situations where 
the government can demonstrate that those who receive the speech 
at issue understand it to be the government’s speech.253 Helen 
Norton, one of the proponents of this approach, offers a two-part 
test to assess whether the government has met its burden in showing 
that meaningful accountability is possible: 
[T]he government can establish its entitlement to the government 
speech defense only when it establishes itself as the source of that 
expression both as a formal and as a functional matter. In other 
words, government must expressly claim the speech as its own 
when it authorizes or creates a communication and onlookers must 
 
staged a fake press conference with public affairs staffers at the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency in 2007. See Al Kamen, FEMA Meets the Press, Which Happens to Be . . . 
FEMA, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 26, 2007, at A.19; Howard Kurtz, Administration 
Paid Commenter, THE WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 8, 2005, at A01. 
 251. Peter Steiner, Cartoon, THE NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61, available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Internet,_nobody_knows_you’re_a_dog. 
 252. Norton & Citron, supra note 83, at 902 (citations omitted). 
 253. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 7, at 1384 (stating that “government speech 
should be limited to purposeful action by government, expressing its own distinct message, 
which is understood by those who receive it to be the government’s message”); Leslie Gielow 
Jacobs, Who’s Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 35, 57, 61 (2002); Lee, supra note 250, at 1052 (noting that accountability requires 
that “a reasonable recipient understands that the government bears responsibility for a 
communication”); Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s 
Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 599 (2008) (concluding that “meaningful accountability [must 
be] a key measure of government speech”).  
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understand the message to be the government’s at the time of its 
delivery.254 
Norton goes on to explain why the government must satisfy 
both a formal and functional test and how courts should evaluate 
these requirements.255 Her contention that the government speech 
doctrine must be concerned with how the recipients of speech 
understand its source is clearly in keeping with Justice Souter’s 
concurrence in Summum, where he stated that “the best 
approach . . . is to ask whether a reasonable and fully informed 
observer would understand the expression to be government speech, 
as distinct from private speech the government chooses to oblige.”256  
After Johanns and Summum, however, it is not clear that the 
Court considers it relevant whether the public know their 
government is claiming the speech as its own; in fact, the Court’s 
decision in Johanns casts considerable doubt on such a requirement. 
Nevertheless, this approach is gaining acceptance in the lower courts, 
which “appear reluctant to embrace the Court’s focus on 
government’s establishment and control of contested expression 
largely because of its troubling implications that the more 
government controls speech, the more speech it will be permitted to 
control.”257 The Seventh and Eighth Circuits,258 for example, have 
adopted tests that are similar to the approach Justice Souter outlined 
in his dissent in Johanns and his concurrence in Summum.259  
 
 254. Norton, supra note 253, at 599. 
 255. See id. at 599–618. 
 256. 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1142 (2009) (Souter, J., concurring). It is not clear, however, that 
Justice Souter would require that the government take affirmative steps to identify itself as the 
speaker if the context and circumstances are insufficient to lead a reasonable observer to 
conclude the speech at issue is the government’s. See id. (finding that the circumstances 
surrounding the monuments gave a sufficient indication that they were government speech). 
 257. Norton & Citron, supra note 83, at 916–17 n.89 (citing Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. 
Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 337 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s position 
has the potential of permitting a governmental entity to engage in viewpoint discrimination in 
its own governmentally-owned channels so long as the governmental entity can cast its actions 
as its own speech after the fact. What is to stop a governmental entity from applying the 
doctrine to a parade? Or official events? It is nearly impossible to concoct examples of 
viewpoint discrimination on government channels that cannot otherwise be repackaged ex post 
as ‘government speech.’” (citations omitted))). 
 258. Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2009); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 
547 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009). 
 259. In Choose Life Ilinois., Inc. v. White, the Seventh Circuit addressed the question 
whether Illinois’ decision not to allow an anti-abortion advocacy group to issue a “choose life” 
specialty license plate was a violation of the group’s First Amendment rights. 547 F.3d at 858. 
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The tests adopted by these appellate courts are in keeping with 
the rationale for granting government speech special status under the 
First Amendment in the first place: namely that an informed 
electorate can hold government accountable for its speech. In fact, 
both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits made a point of distinguishing 
Johanns, choosing instead to embrace the approach espoused by 
Justice Souter that the inquiry be centered on what a reasonable and 
fully informed observer would conclude with regard to whether the 
speech is private or governmental.  
From a government accountability perspective, a test that focuses 
on whether a reasonable recipient would conclude that the 
government is speaking may be enough to ensure that meaningful 
accountability is possible. However, Professor Norton’s other prong, 
which requires that the government also “make clear its intent to 
communicate its own views at the time it creates or authorizes the 
expression,”260 would accomplish several laudable objectives in 
addition to increasing the likelihood that meaningful government 
accountability will occur.  
Demanding that government take formal steps to claim speech as 
its own will “force[] the government to articulate, and thus think 
carefully about, its expressive decisions.”261 It also improves the 
information available to the recipients of government speech who 
will be in a better position to assess the information’s reliability and 
 
In deciding whether messages on specialty license plates are private or government speech, the 
Seventh Circuit stated that the “test can be distilled (and simplified) by focusing on the 
following inquiry: Under all the circumstances, would a reasonable person consider the speaker 
to be the government or a private party?” Id. at 863. The Seventh Circuit went on to note that 
the “[f]actors bearing on this analysis include, but are not limited to, the degree to which the 
message originates with the government, the degree to which the government exercises 
editorial control over the message, and whether the government or a private party 
communicates the message.” Id. After analyzing these factors, the Seventh Circuit rejected the 
state’s contention that its specialty-license plate program was government speech. Id.  
 260. Norton, supra note 253, at 599. 
 261. Id. at 601–02. Requiring that the government articulate its expressive choices may 
also improve the functioning of democratic society. As Mark Fenster notes: 
[T]ransparent reasoning and decisionmaking by a representative body enable public 
discussion and the broadening of citizens’ and officials’ moral and political 
perspectives. A deliberative understanding of the publicity principle requires that 
government give public justifications for its policies and promote rational, critical 
public debate and unrestricted communication in order to enable development of a 
functional, democratic public sphere. 
Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 897 (2006) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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potential biases. For example, if the women who received pregnancy 
counseling in Rust were made aware of the government’s intrusion 
into the doctor-patient relationship, they could assess whether they 
were receiving appropriate medical advice—and whether they needed 
to seek additional information elsewhere.  
Demanding that government be transparent about its expressive 
activities at the point of communication also prevents the 
government from engaging in subterfuge by manufacturing the kind 
of after-the-fact justifying policies and programs that Justice Alito 
conceded in Summum were a legitimate concern when government 
seeks special treatment under the government speech doctrine.262 
Moreover, it will force government to be more transparent about its 
actions in a broad range of areas, impacting both the design of 
government websites and the development of Internet architecture 
more generally.  
B. Accountability, Transparency, and Website Design 
The challenge lies in translating the aspirational goal of 
government accountability into practical measures the government 
can implement if it wishes to engage in viewpoint discrimination 
under the auspices of the government speech doctrine. Fortunately, 
the government has a number of options available that permit it to 
be transparent about its expressive activities. This is particularly so 
when the government speaks online, where many of the cost and 
space constraints it faces in the physical world fade away.  
Even in the physical world, imposing a requirement on 
government that it take steps to identify itself as a speaker would be 
an insignificant burden on the government. In Summum, for 
example, the city need only have added a plaque stating that it 
selected the monuments that were installed in the park.263 Similarly, 
in Johanns the tag line at the bottom of each advertisement could 
have mentioned that the “Beef. It’s What’s For Dinner” campaign 
 
 262. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009) (noting that 
“Respondent voices the legitimate concern that the government speech doctrine not be used as 
a subterfuge for favoring certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint”). 
 263. It would have been even more beneficial from the perspective of government 
accountability if the city also included on its plague it selection criteria: that it selected 
monuments that “either (1) directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove, or (2) were 
donated by groups with longstanding ties to the Pleasant Grove community.” Id. at 1130.  
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was conducted at the behest of the Department of Agriculture.264 
There is little, if any, additional cost to the government in being 
transparent about its role as speaker in these contexts.  
In the online world, the marginal cost to the government of 
being transparent about its expressive activities is nearly zero. In fact, 
the government has access to a powerful set of tools that it can use 
to identify itself as the speaker or to disclaim the speech of private 
parties. These tools give the government great flexibility in designing 
its websites, including the ability to use graphics, audio, video, and 
hyperlinks to create online discussion spaces that reinforce 
governmental transparency.  
1. Government-authored speech 
The first decision the government faces when it creates a website 
is how to identify the website. All websites have what is called a 
uniform resource locator (URL) that essentially serves as the 
website’s address.265 For example, the FCC’s website on broadband 
policy resides at Broadband.gov. The “.gov” portion of the URL, 
which is called a top level domain (TLD), indicates that the website 
is operated by or on behalf of the government.266 Use of “.gov” and 
other government TLDs such as “.mil” and “fed.us” are only 
available to state and federal government entities and are 
administered by the General Services Administration.267 
In 2004, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a 
memorandum informing all federal agencies with public-facing 
websites that they must comply with certain transparency 
requirements.268 On the topic of URLs, the OMB instructed that all 
agencies must clearly indicate the government’s involvement in the 
website: 
 
 264. Instead, the government dissembled. See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying 
text. Moreover, the government never offered a reason why it was interested in having 
Americans eat more steak. 
 265. See generally Tim Berners-Lee, Roy T. Fielding,  & Larry Masinter, Uniform 
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax, INTERNET SOCIETY, http://labs.apache.org/ 
webarch/uri/rfc/rfc3986.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
 266. See WIKIPEDIA, Top-Level Domain, (Feb. 22, 2011 5:03pm) 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Top-level_domain (last visited Feb. 14, 2011). 
 267. See 41 C.F.R. § 102–73. 
 268. Clay Johnson III, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies (Dec. 17, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2005/m05-
04.pdf. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/21/2011 12:24 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
2036 
Your agency must use only .gov, .mil, or Fed.us domains unless the 
agency head explicitly determines another domain is necessary for 
the proper performance of an agency function. . . . This 
requirement recognizes the proper performance of agency 
functions includes an obligation for clear and unambiguous public 
notification of the agency’s involvement in or sponsorship of its 
information dissemination products including public websites.269 
Like a sign indicating that one has entered government property, 
the website’s URL communicates to the public that they have 
accessed a communication space that is under government control. 
While this might be a sufficient signal to readers when the 
government’s website is relatively simple and contains only 
government authored content, many government websites include 
both government authored pages and pages where private parties can 
engage in expressive activities. For these more complicated websites, 
the government should do more than simply rely on the website’s 
URL as an indication of its role; it should unambiguously identify 
which speech it claims as its own and which speech it does not.  
Government has at its disposal a variety of source indicators that 
it can use to communicate authorship to the public. The most 
effective way the government can do this is through express cues.270 
For example, when government employees are speaking on behalf of 
the government, they can signal government authorship by attaching 
their name and government position to the material they are 
disseminating or by adding other clear indicators of government 
authorship that are akin to the way government letterhead 
communicates governmental origin.271 In addition to express cues, 
contextual cues such as the location of speech and past government 
practices can also be effective ways of signaling that government is 
speaking.272 Because express cues are the most effective way to signal 
government authorship, however, “governments seeking to protect 
 
 269. Id. at 4. 
 270. See Norton, supra note 253, at 607–09. 
 271. Government employees speaking on behalf of the government are also likely to be 
able to easily satisfy the control test for government speech because they “exercise final 
approval authority over every word used.” See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 
550, 561 (2005); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
 272. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1133 (2009) (observing that 
the monument’s location “on public property” and “the general government practice with 
respect to donated monuments” would serve to indicate the identity of the speaker); Norton, 
supra note 253, at 607, 610. 
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the integrity of their own expression should design their 
communications in a way that enhances, rather than obscures, 
transparency by employing express cues whenever possible.”273  
Again, the website design tools available to the government 
make the inclusion of express cues a simple matter. The Federal Web 
Managers Council, “an inter-agency group of about 40 web 
managers from every cabinet-level agency and many independent 
agencies,” provides guidance to government website operators on 
how they can achieve this level of transparency.274 The group, which 
operates USA.gov, instructs federal agencies to 
clearly display the name of your agency or organization on every 
web page to show visitors who sponsors the website. Be sure it’s 
clear on every page that the site is maintained by the U.S. 
government. . . . By clearly displaying your agency’s name and 
sponsorship on every page of your website, you’re clearly telling the 
public that your agency is accountable for the website’s content. 
Visitors do not always come to your website through the “front 
door.” Many enter at a second, third, fourth, or lower level. So you 
need to be sure that visitors can identify the sponsorship of your 
website, no matter where they are within your site.275 
2. Mixed governmental and private speech 
The challenge for government website operators arises when the 
website includes not just government-authored speech, but also 
expression provided by private parties, whether in the form of user 
comments, links to private websites, or other third-party content. 
Indeed, it is becoming increasingly common for government 
websites to incorporate such speech alongside government-authored 
content.276 Because it can be very difficult for the public to 
distinguish between governmental speech and private speech in this 
context, it is imperative that the government speech doctrine be 
 
 273. Norton, supra note 253, at 605 (suggesting that “[a]s an incentive for governments 
to engage in such transparency, express cues might trigger a rebuttable presumption that a 
contested message is governmental in origin and thus free from Free Speech Clause scrutiny, 
while their absence may be presumed to signal a nongovernmental source”). 
 274. WEBCONTENT.GOV, About Us, http://www.howto.gov/about-us (last visited Feb. 
14, 2011). 
 275. WEBCONTENT.GOV, Showing U.S. Government Sponsorship, http://www.usa.gov/ 
webcontent/reqs_bestpractices/best_practices/sponshorship.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 
2011). 
 276. See supra Part II.A. 
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predicated on the requirement that the government be transparent 
about its intent and actions with regard to such private speech. 
Recall that even as to speech created by private parties, the 
government is not precluded from claiming the speech as 
government speech if the government’s intent is to promote its own 
message rather than to facilitate private speech, and it exercises 
sufficient control over the message being conveyed.277 While at first 
blush it may seem unlikely that the government could successfully 
claim that the comment section on its website—with multiple and 
varied messages from private speakers—is government speech,278 the 
government speech doctrine contains no bar to its application in 
such a context. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has stated that 
private input does not obviate a finding of government speech.279  
Moreover, the government may be able to demonstrate the 
requisite degree of control over user comments by showing either 
that it maintained editorial control over the content of the 
messages,280 or that it had authority to determine which messages 
were ultimately published.281 The latter form of control is actually 
 
 277. See supra notes 156–86 and accompanying text. 
 278. See Norton, supra note 253, at 615 (“Some courts contend that the presence of a 
variety of messages within a particular setting undermines the conclusion, as a functional 
matter, that the government could be the author of them all.”). Given the paucity of 
government speech cases, it is likely that a court would look to both the public forum and 
government speech doctrines to address these questions. The public forum and government 
speech doctrines are intertwined in that they define the ends of a continuum. Moreover, the 
government speech doctrine gestated within the public forum doctrine, as several of the early 
decisions that the Court now characterizes as government speech cases were not understood to 
be so at the time. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 
217 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 819 (1995); 
515 U.S. at 819; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991). 
 279. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (stating “[a] 
government entity may exercise this same freedom to express its views when it receives 
assistance from private sources for the purpose of delivering a government-controlled 
message”); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005) (where the 
government controls the message, “it is not precluded from relying on the government-speech 
doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental sources”); Rosenberger, 
515 U.S. at 833 (government may “regulate the content of what is or is not expressed . . . 
when it enlists private entities to convey its own message”). 
 280. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 561 (finding government speech because government 
controlled “every word” of the promotional materials). 
 281. See Summum, 119 S. Ct. at 1134 (selection of donated monuments); Johanns, 544 
U.S. at 561 (approval of privately created advertising materials); Illinois Dunesland Pres. Soc’y, 
584 F.3d at 725 (selection of brochures for display racks in Illinois Beach State Park); Gittens 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23, 30 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (selection of statues placed around Washington, DC); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 
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quite common on private websites, where moderation tools give 
website operators the ability to approve every comment before it is 
publicly accessible.282  
Because these tools make it relatively easy for the government to 
exercise control over private speech – and there are strong pressures 
on the government to do so – it is likely that government will use 
them to implement content-based restrictions. For example, the 
government will undoubtedly want to impose civility guidelines on 
its websites, as many private website operators do. As discussed in 
Part II, the government would face significant First Amendment 
challenges under the public forum doctrine if it were to prohibit 
profane and contentious speech in a public forum.283 Unlike the 
public forum doctrine, however, the government speech doctrine 
does not demand that the government demonstrate that such speech 
would be disruptive to the purpose of its forum. Nor does the 
government speech doctrine require that the government articulate 
narrow, objective standards or even that it be consistent in applying 
its putative limitations.284 The government speech doctrine’s only 
demand is that the government show that it “effectively controlled” 
the speech of third parties.285 Accordingly, under existing 
government speech jurisprudence, the government would have wide 
latitude to restrict, remove, or otherwise moderate private speech. 
That a court might hold that the government speech doctrine 
permits the government to exercise such broad discretion over public 
comments on a government website reinforces the importance of 
 
228 F.3d 1003, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000) (oversight over postings on school bulletin board); cf. 
Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998) (observing that public 
broadcasters engage in expressive activities when they “facilitate the expression of some 
viewpoints instead of others”); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bost., 
Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569–70 (1995) (expressive choice in selection of parade participants). 
 282. Almost all website content management systems provide built-in tools for 
moderating conversations or comments created by third-party users of the website. For 
example, vBulletin, a popular software product for forum websites, allows a website operator to 
manipulate user discussions (or “threads”) by editing, deleting, or moving user submissions 
through a menu interface only accessible to the operator. See Wayne Luke, BULLETIN, A Quick 
Guide to Moderating Your Forum, http://www.vbulletin.com/forum/content.php?243-
Quick-Guide-to-Moderating-Your-Forum (last visited Feb. 14, 2011). Similarly, in WordPress, 
a widely used blog publishing platform, website operators can moderate comments submitted 
by website visitors on a post-by-post basis. WORDPRESS, Comment Moderation, 
http://codex.wordpress.org/Comment_Moderation (last visited Feb. 14, 2011). 
 283.  See supra Part II.C. 
 284.  See supra Part III.B. 
 285.  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134. 
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requiring that the government be transparent about its intentions 
and activities when it plans to assert that its actions are exempt from 
First Amendment scrutiny. While there may be countervailing 
reasons why the government should not be given the power to claim 
private speech as government speech in this context, political 
accountability can at least serve as a check against government 
overreaching and as a remedy for those speakers who have been 
excluded—if the government is required to be transparent about its 
expressive activities.  
If, however, the government is permitted to remove or restrict 
private speech on the basis of viewpoint and is not required to 
communicate to the public that it is doing so, there is a danger that 
the government’s systematic exclusion of certain viewpoints will 
distort public discourse, including giving the appearance of 
consensus on issues where disagreement exists.286 Indeed, the more 
government manipulates public debate in this fashion, the greater 
the harm to free-speech values.287 Furthermore, as Judge Torruella 
warned in Sutliffe v. Epping School District, government can—under 
the guise of the government speech doctrine—actually make 
accountability less effective because it can “silence opposition by 
narrowing the fora in which opposing views may be expressed.”288  
Should government choose to be transparent about its 
intentions, it will find that its website designers have a number of 
options available that permit it to communicate what actions it is 
taking with regard to private speech. The Federal Web Managers 
Council, for example, provides helpful guidance on how government 
officials can do this. In the context of hyperlinks, the Council advises 
that agencies should “[d]evelop and post a clear and comprehensive 
 
 286. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(cautioning that “content-based speech restrictions . . . are particularly susceptible to being 
used by the government to distort public debate.”). Government subterfuge also raises other 
“risks to First Amendment interests,” including “distortion of the private marketplace for 
expression; displacement of private speech through conversion or alteration of meaning; and 
deception about who authored a message.” Bezanson & Buss, supra note 7, at 1384. 
 287. See Howard M. Wasserman, Bartnicki as Lochner: Some Thoughts on First 
Amendment Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 201, 216 (2005) (observing that “the more the 
law looks like governmental censorship or governmental manipulation of public debate, thus 
the greater the harm to free-speech values”); Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: 
The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1122 
(2002) (“It is not that content-based regulation of speech is inherently despotic, but that it 
inherently lends itself to despotism.”). 
 288. 584 F.3d. at 337 (Torruella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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policy for linking to other websites.”289 It also suggests that federal 
websites should clearly indicate that a link goes to a private website 
by: “Placing an icon next to the link; Identifying the destination 
website in the link text or description itself; Inserting an intercepting 
page that displays the notification, after the user selects the link; and 
Displaying all non-federal links in a separate listing from federal 
links.”290 
The express cues the Council identifies, including icons, 
explanatory link text, segregated content, and interstitial pages, can 
be implemented by government website designers to indicate to 
readers that the government has restricted, edited, or removed 
private speech.291 Even better, government can use these tools to 
explain what it has done and what its policy is regarding the 
moderation or removal of private speech. Of course, government 
should be just as transparent when it is disclaiming private speech,292 
whether that speech is in the form of user comments or links to the 
websites of private parties.293 
Accordingly, if the government wishes to protect the integrity of 
its expression and ensure robust public discourse, it should clearly 
designate what portions of its website contain speech that it claims as 
its own and which portions it disclaims. Again, some government 
websites are already implementing this approach. For example, 
Business.gov, which is operated by the U.S. Small Business 
Administration (SBA), contains a number of government authored 
and private party pages that cover such topics as starting a business 
and writing a business plan.294 At the bottom of each page authored 
 
 289. WEBCONTENT.GOV, Establish a Link Policy, http://www.usa.gov/webcontent/ 
managing_content/organizing/links/policy.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2011). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Google does this very effectively when it takes users to an interstitial page notifying 
them that content has been removed pursuant to a takedown request from a copyright holder 
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. See Wendy Seltzer, Unsafe Harbors: Abusive 
DMCA Subpoenas and Takedown Demands, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/ 20030926_unsafe_harbors.php#_edn3 (last visited Feb. 21, 
2011). 
 292. See Norton, supra note 253, at 602 (noting that “the government can decline to 
claim certain speech as its own as a formal matter” and providing examples). 
 293. When the government does this, however, the restrictions it imposes on private 
speech will be evaluated under the public forum doctrine, including that doctrine’s prohibition 
on viewpoint-based discrimination. See supra Part II.C. 
 294. The SBA states that the website provides “small business owners with information 
and resources they need to comply with laws and regulations, and to take advantage of 
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by the government, the SBA states: “Business.gov is an official site of 
the U.S. Small Business Administration.”295  
The SBA website also contains an extensive community forum 
“where entrepreneurs and small business owners [can] learn, share, 
and discuss practical solutions to everyday business problems.”296 
Although the link to the website’s “Community Rules of Conduct 
and Disclaimer” could be more prominently featured on each page, 
the SBA makes clear that it is disclaiming the private speech in the 
forums: “Except when specifically noted, any views or opinions 
expressed on the Business.gov Community forums, blogs or 
member-contributed resources are those of the individual 
contributors. The views and posted comments do not necessarily 
reflect those of the Business Gateway Program Office, the U.S. Small 
Business Administration, partner agencies, or the Federal 
government.”297 
When it comes to government speech on government websites, 
it is clear that government already has access to the tools it needs to 
be transparent about its expressive activities. The real question is 
whether government has the will to do so and whether the law 
provides sufficient incentives when that will is lacking. The fact is 
that many government websites currently implement features that 
indicate government authorship and disclaim private speech. Making 
this a requirement of the government speech doctrine would simply 
enshrine a set of practices that already are extant across many 
government websites.298  
V. CONCLUSION 
Over the past decade, governments at all levels have moved with 
alacrity to engage with their citizens online, launching thousands of 
government websites, including blogs, discussion boards, and other 
 
government programs and services to help them start, expand and run their businesses.” 
BUSINESS.GOV, About Us, http://www.business.gov/about/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
 295. Id. 
 296. BUSINESS.GOV, Community Rules of Conduct and Disclaimer, 
http://www.business.gov/about/policies/community/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
 297. Id. 
 298. This is not to say, however, that government does not sometimes act in ways that 
reduce transparency. See, e.g., Chris Soghoian, Recovery.gov Blocked Search Engine Tracking, 
CNET.NEWS (Feb. 19, 2009, 5:41am), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13739_3-10167373-
46.html (reporting that the “Obama administration has apparently opted to forbid Google and 
other search engines from indexing any content on the newly launched Recovery.gov”). 
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online platforms that solicit public participation. Not unlike private 
website operators, the government does not want these platforms to 
be used for discriminatory, abusive, and profane speech. But unlike 
private website operators, the government’s efforts to moderate 
public discourse must comport with the First Amendment. Given 
that the public forum doctrine presents significant challenges for the 
government when it restricts private speech, it is likely that the 
government—and the courts—will look to the government speech 
doctrine to provide flexibility in dealing with disputes over speech on 
government websites. 
While it may be the case that granting the government this 
flexibility will actually increase the opportunities for public discourse, 
there are reasons to be concerned that the government speech 
doctrine accords government too much discretion to claim private 
speech as its own. This problem is exacerbated by the Supreme 
Court’s present unwillingness to require that the government take 
affirmative steps to ensure that political accountability can serve as a 
check on government overreaching. In the context of government 
websites, where governmental speech is often intertwined with 
private speech, this lack of accountability raises the danger that 
government subterfuge will distort public discourse and subvert core 
First Amendment principles. 
Echoing Justice Souter’s concurrence in Summum, this Article 
argues that the government speech doctrine should be grounded in 
meaningful governmental accountability. At the very least, the 
doctrine should be predicated on government demonstrating that a 
reasonable and fully informed observer would understand the 
expression to be government speech, as distinct from private speech 
the government chooses to oblige. Translated into practical terms, 
the government must demonstrate that it claimed the disputed 
speech as its own when it authorized or created the expression and 
that a reasonable observer would understand the expression to be the 
government’s speech.  
Fortunately, government already has the means to be transparent 
about its expressive activities, especially in the context of government 
websites. Insisting that the government do so in order to obtain the 
benefits of the government speech doctrine will reinforce the 
importance of government transparency not just in its 
communication, but also across other government functions. It also 
will inspire the design and development of communication 
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technologies that allow for more effective attribution and identity 
systems on both governmental and private websites and networks.299  
As more speech migrates from the physical to the digital, the 
government speech doctrine—if it is grounded in meaningful 
accountability—can help to ensure that government leads the way in 
configuring these new virtual town squares as places that support 
robust public discourse. Indeed, as Jack Balkin predicted, it may be 
that “the most important decisions affecting the future of freedom of 
speech will not occur in constitutional law; they will be decisions 
about technological design, legislative and administrative regulations, 




 299. Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in A Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 
427, 441 (2009) (“Digital technologies, like the Internet itself, do not have to be structured in 
any particular way. We can design them so that they promote participation and innovation by 
large numbers of people. Or we can design them so that they are far less participatory, so that 
the Internet becomes a locked-down content delivery system designed for large enterprises, 
like broadcast and cable television are today.”). 
 300. Id. at 427. 
